

## MODERN INTERPRETATION OF PINDAR: THE SECOND PYTHIAN AND SEVENTH NEMEAN ODES

SINCE I was taken, thirty-five years ago, to hear E. R. Dodds lecture on the *Bacchae*, his work has been one of my chief sources of inspiration. My Sather Lectures form a kind of commentary on his; and if I sometimes disagree with him, or see things from a different point of view, that will not prevent the understanding reader from seeing how greatly I admire him and how much my work owes to his. His inaugural lecture at Oxford was called 'Humanism and Technique in Greek Studies';<sup>1</sup> and no great scholar of our time, except perhaps Rudolf Pfeiffer, has kept so perfect a balance between the two. In that lecture Dodds, as the circumstances of the time required, pleaded for more attention to the content, as against the form, of ancient writings; and throughout his career he has applied his masterly technique to just those problems of the ancient world which are of most interest and importance to the modern. But he has always borne in mind that a scholar who hopes to throw light upon such problems must do all he can to master the technique of his profession.<sup>2</sup> Both in his humanism and in his technique, he offers an example from which all classical scholars of our time can profit.

To me Pindar seems one of the greatest Greek and also one of the greatest European poets. But some would dispute this proposition; and I believe that many even of those who would assent to it in reality admire him less than other great poets who seem to me to be his equals. There are two main reasons why Pindar has received less than justice. One is that he is believed to have a narrow and restricted outlook, which is often unfavourably compared with that of the great tragedians; the other is that he is difficult. The question of whether Pindar's outlook is narrow I shall treat comparatively briefly here; I shall not try here to describe that outlook at any length, though I may do so later. In comparing it with that of the tragedians, I shall be able to save space because of having already, in my book *The Justice of Zeus*, written about the *Weltanschauung* of the early Greek poets. Next, I shall pass to the difficulties which Pindar presents to modern readers. The difficulty with which I shall be most concerned will be that of eluding the dangers inherent in the romantic and historicist approach to Pindar which until eleven years ago was adopted in virtually all modern treatments and which still comes most naturally to most readers, including several distinguished scholars. In 1962 Elroy L. Bundy<sup>3</sup> raised issues of central importance not only for the historical understanding but also for the literary appreciation of the poet, and so initiated a critical discussion which is still proceeding. My best way of contributing to this discussion within the space at my disposal will be to give a specimen treatment of two poems. I have chosen two poems of great difficulty, the Second Pythian and the Seventh Nemean, and I have chosen these particular poems because they will best serve to illustrate my attitude to the new tendency in Pindaric studies. The Second Pythian has been discussed very little in recent years, the Seventh Nemean very often; my treatment of the latter will therefore be comparatively brief. The problems of the Second Pythian seem to me to a large extent soluble when attacked from the starting-point recommended by Professor Bundy; the Seventh Nemean, on the other hand, will serve to show that the consequences of treating a poem in blind obedience to a theory erected into a dogma may

<sup>1</sup> Oxford, 1936.

<sup>2</sup> In 1964 he wrote, 'Textual criticism must always remain an essential part of the training of any literary scholar; and even the ordinary man who will never be a scholar ought to know something of the history of the texts he reads and the methods by which they were established. . . . It would be

wrong in principle, even if it were possible in practice, to exclude textual criticism completely from the undergraduate course . . .' (*Proc. Class. Assn.* 61, 1964, 19). Then as in 1936, Professor Dodds stressed most what most needed stressing at the time.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 116.

be unfortunate. To deal adequately with the questions raised by Bundy would need a large book; all I can do here is to draw attention to a few of them.

Most of my readers will at least pay lip service to the statement which I made above, that Pindar is one of the greatest Greek, and one of the greatest European poets. But for English-speaking readers he has never meant as much as any of the three great tragedians; and many who would accept my claim would hesitate to agree that he was as great a poet as Aeschylus or Sophocles. Despite all changes of fashion since it was published in 1897, Gilbert Murray's judgment expressed in the history of Greek literature which he published at the age of thirty-one<sup>4</sup> would be echoed by many readers even now. 'Often in thinking over the best pieces of Pindar', Murray wrote, '—the majestic organ-playing,<sup>4a</sup> the grave strong magic of language, the lightning-flashes of half-revealed mystery—, one wonders why this man is not counted the greatest poet that ever lived, why he has not done more, mattered more. The answer perhaps is that he was a poet and nothing else.' 'The thing that he loved', Murray says later, 'was real heroism. But he could not see it out of its traditional setting; and when the setting was there, his own imagination sufficed to create the heroism.' Pindar, he repeats later, 'is nothing but a poet. There is little rhetoric, no philosophy, little human interest; only that fine bloom—which he calls *ἄωρον*—which comes when the most sensitive language meets the most exquisite thought. . . .' Although some of the most influential scholars in England and America disagreed—Jebb<sup>4b</sup> and Gildersleeve in the nineteenth, Bowra and J. H. Finley in the twentieth century—I think most modern readers of Pindar would underwrite this judgement.

In Germany the case is different. By far the greatest contribution to the scholarly explanation of Pindar has been made by Germans; and for German poets of the great period, Pindar has been important as he has never been for French, Italian or English poets. Although they claimed to write Pindaric odes, Ronsard and Chiabrera, Cowley and Gray,<sup>5</sup> are further from Pindar than Goethe,<sup>6</sup> and further still than Hölderlin.<sup>7</sup> But even in Germany the acceptance of Pindar as a poet has, for the most part, been less than whole-hearted. 'Pindar', wrote Eduard Schwartz in 1902,<sup>8</sup> 'ist weder ein reicher noch ein gefälliger Dichtergeist. Der Kreis seiner Gedanken ist streng geschlossen, der Pomp seiner Sprache steif, die Formen seiner Poesie konventionell; die Sache, der er diente, war längst nicht mehr lebendig und berechtigt zu dauern.' Wilamowitz was in many ways a sympathetic interpreter of Pindar. Yet he could write in the closing chapter of his *Pindaros* of 1922:<sup>9</sup> 'Seine Welt ist uns ganz fremd; ihre Sitten, ihr Dichten und Trachten

<sup>4</sup> *The Literature of Ancient Greece*, 1897 (reprinted 1956), 112.

<sup>4a</sup> Why do people always mention organ-playing in connection with Pindar? Is it simply a reminiscence of Tennyson's famous line about Milton? Or is it because Jebb rendered Browning's *Abt Vogler* (*Translations into Greek and Latin Verse*, 2nd edn., 1907, 2 f.) into the metre of the Fourth Pythian Ode?

<sup>4b</sup> See *Essays and Addresses*, 1907, 41 f. (= *JHS* 3, 1882, 144 f.).

<sup>5</sup> See G. Highet, *The Classical Tradition*, 1949, 230 f. (with notes); D. M. Robinson, *Pindar, a Poet of Eternal Ideas*, 1936, is useful for its information about modern translations and imitations, if for nothing else. On Ronsard, see in particular I. Silver, *The Pindaric Odes of Ronsard*, 1937. Most Pindarising poetry since the Renaissance has less to do with the real Pindar than with the Pindar of Horace, *Odes* 4.2; see E. Fraenkel, *Horace*, 1957, 435.

<sup>6</sup> See E. Grumach, *Goethe und die Antike*, I, 1949, 226 f.; cf. A. Lesky, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 1966, 633 f.

<sup>7</sup> See M. B. Benn, *Hölderlin and Pindar*, The Hague 1962, useful for its bibliography.

<sup>8</sup> *Charakterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur*, 4th edn., 1956, 32.

<sup>9</sup> P. 463; the opening words seem to echo A. Croiset, *La poésie de Pindare*, 1880, iii: 'Ce monde dorien dont il est la dernière grande voix est bien plus loin de nous qu'Athènes et que l'Ionie; le fond et la forme, les idées et l'art nous en sont étrangers.' That Homer is 'antipathetic' to Pindar is evidently deduced from *Nem.* 7.20 f. The deduction is not justified; it is normal for a poet to say that other poets sometimes tell lies, whereas he himself tells the truth (cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 24-9, and see below, p. 130 f.) At *Isthm.* 4.37 f. Homer appears under a different aspect. The admiration and gratitude which we owe to Wilamowitz cannot prevent me from remarking that this passage shows all the arrogant and ponderous philistinism of a Berlin public monument of the Wilhelmine era.

für uns reizlos, wenn nicht anstössig. Er selbst ist kein reicher Geist. Von Macht und Grösse des Vaterlandes weiss er nicht, nichts von Fortschritt in irgendwelcher Richtung. Weder die Erkundung der weiten Erde noch die Lösung der tausend Rätsel reizt ihn, die uns die Natur um uns und in uns ergibt. Wissenschaft ahnt er nicht; träte sie ihm nahe, würde er sie als gottlose Torheit abweisen. All das Grosse, an dem unsere Seele hängt, ist ionisch-attisch; aber von diesem Wesen mag er nichts wissen; nicht nur Odysseus, Homer selbst ist ihm antipathisch. Fremdartig ist uns selbst seine Kunst, nicht minder in dem, was ihm eigen ist wie in dem gegebenen Stile.' These words were written in 1922; they may be supplemented by a quotation from a living scholar who has done great services to Pindar. 'Während Pindar in Theben wirkt', writes Bruno Snell,<sup>10</sup> 'bildet sich in Attika ein ganz neues Verhältnis zur Welt. Die Tragödie erhebt den Anspruch, dass es gerecht auf der Welt zugehen müsse, and stellt damit mancherlei Forderungen an die Menschen, aber auch an die Götter, ohne sie stets erfüllt zu finden,—und dabei verstummt das Rühmen. Pindar hält sich bewusst von solchen Gedanken fern, die ihm Anmassung sind. Wohl ändert er gelegentlich einen Einzelzug der überlieferten Sage, der ihm den Glanz des Göttlichen zu trüben scheint, aber er verfällt keinem Zweifel an der Ordnung und Schönheit des Lebens, so schwach und hinfällig auch das Irdische sein mag, und er fühlt sich nicht bemüsst, am Bestehenden ändern zu wollen. In vornehmer Gelassenheit nehmt er die Welt, wie sie ist, —die trotz allem Dunkel durchweht ist von den goldenen Fäden der Himmlischen.' All these writers consider Pindar a great poet; but would any of them hold him to be the equal of Aeschylus or Sophocles? I doubt it.

Let us consider what these criticisms amount to. Pindar was a Theban; he belonged to a community of Dorian origin. Thebes was ruled by an oligarchy, and Pindar himself is commonly held to have been an aristocrat; most of his patrons were of West Greek origin, some were kings or tyrants, and all the rest appear to have been noblemen. Scholars like to remind us that Pindar's world was perishing even before his death, as though this were not true of other great poets and as though it somehow diminished the value of his poetry. Pindar's outlook, it is felt, was narrowly restricted; and it is unfavourably contrasted with the progressive and optimistic attitude to the world held to characterise the Attic tragedians. By itself the fact of having been a Theban and an aristocrat or a sympathiser would hardly be sufficient to prove the point; but evidence of a restricted outlook has been discovered by some scholars in Pindar's actual works. Can any defence be offered?

First, the cultural differences which divided the west Greeks from the east Greeks in Pindar's time have been, we must agree, considerably exaggerated. It could not be contended that such differences existed in the field of art; and it is doubtful whether west and east Greek poets felt that they belonged to different worlds. It appears from comedy that the poems of Alcman, Stesichorus and Ibycus were well known at Athens.<sup>11</sup> Poets like Simonides, Bacchylides and Pindar himself were active all over the Greek world; and in the Syracuse of Hieron Pindar and Aeschylus were both welcome. Pindar's dithyramb for Athens was acceptable to the Athenians.<sup>12</sup> Doubtless here as elsewhere the best connoisseurs of poetry were the best educated; but are we to suppose that at Athens only Megacles and a few noblemen<sup>13</sup> could enjoy Pindar's poetry? The leading Greek poets were not felt to be the exclusive property of a particular city, but belonged to a panhellenic tradition going back to Homer and Hesiod.

Science, philosophy and rhetoric were, it is true, at this time mainly an Athenian and

<sup>10</sup> *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* (3rd edn.), 1955, p. 137. Does tragedy demand that justice should be done in the world? In a sense, yes; but in that sense Pindar also does; see p. 126 below.

<sup>11</sup> See Aristophanes, *Lys.* 1297 f.; *Pax* 798 f.; *Thesm.* 161.

<sup>12</sup> See *frs.* 76 f.; cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 272 f.; Bowra, *Pindar* 142-3.

<sup>13</sup> *Pyth.* 7 is for Megacles, *Nem.* 2 for Timodemos of Acharnai.

Ionian preserve, although the contribution of some Sicilian cities of west Greek origin and the careers of some individuals such as Hippias of Elis should remind us that the boundaries could be crossed. But Pindar was a poet, and a poet who wrote for the most part choral lyric, and it is not reasonable to criticise him for neglecting contemporary knowledge. His mention of the eclipse, in the tradition of Archilochus, gives a poet's reaction to that event;<sup>14</sup> whether Pindar as a private person felt like this about it we have no means of knowing. In a poem, he said that philosophers and scientists 'reaped an unprofitable harvest of their wisdom'. From the standpoint of the religious outlook common to the early Greek poets, this is true, and anyone who maintains that Aeschylus or Sophocles would have been shocked by these words does so at his peril. Here, for once, Pindar may profitably be compared with a romantic poet; when Keats protested against Newton's treatment of the rainbow, he was not trying to refute Newton, but expressing his attitude as a poet.

At this point one may remark that the tragedians themselves show a good deal less interest in contemporary speculation than is commonly assumed. Many scholars have asserted that Aeschylus and Sophocles show an acquaintance with presocratic thought; not one has proved it. Euripides makes fairly numerous allusions to contemporary science and philosophy; but how far does this affect the outlook on the world that forms the background of his dramas?

Do his social and political beliefs in fact affect Pindar's poetry so as to render his outlook narrow and parochial? We do not in fact know that Pindar was an aristocrat; Hermann Fränkel has reminded us<sup>15</sup> that since at *Pyth.* 5.75 the 'I' may perfectly well refer to the leader of the chorus, Pindar's descent from the clan of the Aegidae cannot be taken as certain. What is certain is that in his surviving poetry he makes no political pronouncements. Most of the surviving poems are written in honour of west Greek patrons, and not surprisingly he often speaks with respect of the ancient institutions of the Dorians. He repeatedly gives expression to his loyalty to his own city and his acceptance of her way of life. But where does he decry other forms of government? When he says, 'I find fault with a tyrant's lot', he is not attacking tyranny, but disclaiming the wish to be a tyrant, as Archilochus had done before him;<sup>16</sup> when he refers to the popular assembly of a democratic state as 'the noisy host',<sup>17</sup> it is unsafe to assume that the description is meant to be pejorative. Of course his poems contain expressions of sympathy with his friends and patrons. Despite the delicate position of his own city, he applauds, in praising Aeginetans or Athenians, or Spartans, the Greek victory over the Persians;<sup>18</sup> he sympathises in praising Syracusans with the Sicilian Greeks in their struggle with the Carthaginians and Etruscans;<sup>19</sup> and in all probability the Eighth Pythian shows his sympathy with Aegina when she was threatened with destruction. But none of these sympathies involve him in a statement of political principle.

Such a statement would have been alien to the whole tradition of the Greek poets. In the Greece of Pindar's time, poets concerned themselves with the temporary problems of the day only so as to set them against the backcloth of the permanent conditions of existence. Adherence to the rule of 'the few' or 'the many', belief in the desirability of a more or less restricted suffrage, did not affect a man's outlook on the gods and their

<sup>14</sup> *Paean* 9.1 f.

<sup>15</sup> Imre Mueller, *Quomodo Pindarus chori persona usus sit*, Diss. Friburg, Darmstadt, 1914, 29 f.; H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*<sup>2</sup>, 1962, 485, n. 2 (neglected by Bowra, *Pindar*, 100 (cf. 152); K. Latte, *GGA* 207, 1953, 40 = *Kl. Schr.* 723 agreed with Fränkel. [But see M. R. Lefkowitz, *HSCP* 67, 1962, 230 f.]

<sup>16</sup> See David C. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar, Mnemosyne*, Suppl. IX, 1968, 9 f. (on *Pyth.* 2. 53).

<sup>17</sup> At *Pyth.* 2.87 ὁ λάβρος στρατός does not mean 'the brute multitude', as Bowra, *Pindar*, 137 says. The word λάβρος is applied by Homer to winds (*Il.* 2.148; *Od.* 15.625) and water (*Il.* 21.271; *Od.* 15.293), then to speech (*Il.* 23.474, 478-9); here it refers to the noise made by the assembly.

<sup>18</sup> *Isthm.* 5.48; *Nem.* 2.13; *Pyth.* 1.75 f.; see J. H. Finley, *HSCP* 63, 1958, 121 f. (though I have doubts about his interpretation of *Isthm.* 8).

<sup>19</sup> *Pyth.* 1.72; *Nem.* 9.27.

government of the universe or on their attitude to human life. Pindar's attitude to these cannot be said to be restricted by his partiality for a narrow social group, nor does it differ markedly from the attitude of other persons who were not 'oligarchs'.

Pindar does, it is true, frequently insist that true excellence, in war, poetry or sport, is that which comes 'by nature'.<sup>20</sup> He denies true poetic genius to those crow-like persons who have 'learned', presumably by mimicry, and lift up their voices against the bird of Zeus, the true poet.<sup>21</sup> The true poet has been taught, like Phemius in the *Odyssey*, by a god.<sup>22</sup> Just so the gift of warlike or athletic excellence is divine, and recurs in certain families favoured by the gods. As a human action is suggested by a god, but is still the action of its human author, who cannot disavow responsibility, so any great aptitude possessed by a human being is the gift of a god, but the recipient of such a gift must second it by making the greatest effort in his power. This is true not only of the gift of poetry, but of all divine gifts of excellence. In his references to athletic success, Pindar puts the greatest emphasis on the hard work which it demands, however great the victor's natural endowment.<sup>23</sup>

Likewise he makes it clear that athletic skill, although it often occurs in members of the same family, does not occur with regularity. Like everything else in human life, according to Pindar, it is subject to the law of change; it may skip a generation and descend from grandfather to grandson, or it may reappear not in a victor's son, but in his nephew.<sup>24</sup> Pindar repeatedly stresses that no amount of skill combined with practise can in itself command success; success is not possible without the favour of the gods.<sup>25</sup> What is true of victory in the games is true of every kind of human triumph; Pindar's view of athletics is only one aspect of his view of life. The gods sometimes exalt men, but sometimes push them down; not even the life of great heroes is free of misfortune. Pindar's view of human life is not egalitarian. But it is in no way mean, narrow or trivial.

I shall not in this paper attempt a full account of the view of human life which forms the background to Pindar's poetry, though I shall say a little more about it later. Instead, I shall say a word about the tragedians, with whom he is so often unfavourably compared.<sup>26</sup> Were they indeed progressive, optimistic, rational, unlike the reactionary, pessimistic, irrational Pindar?

In the case of Sophocles, the proposition is not easy to sustain. The Sophoclean hero's *aretē* leads him to transgress the bounds set to human aspirations by gods who, in the Greek sense, must be considered just, but whose justice consists not only in punishing mortals for their crimes against each other but in maintaining a universal order in which men have only a humble place and limited prerogatives. Sophocles has sometimes, not without reason, been found to have an affinity with Pindar.

But what of Aeschylus? Had he not a progressive, optimistic outlook? The Aeschylean Zeus has granted to men that 'grace that comes by violence' which consists in the assurance that his justice will ultimately punish their crimes against each other. In comparison with what the gods of other religions offer, that is a somewhat limited concession. The notion of Aeschylus as a progressive optimist is based largely on the final stages of the *Oresteian* trilogy. But what happens at the end of the *Oresteia*? The problem that confronts Athene and the Areopagus resembles the paradoxes of Zeno. Orestes would have been punished had he not avenged his father; yet now he must be punished, according to the Erinyes, guardians of justice, for having killed his mother. Only an arbitrary solution is possible, and such a solution is offered by Athene, basing her decision on the accident of her own

<sup>20</sup> See Bowra, *Pindar*, 5 f.

<sup>21</sup> *Ol.* 2.86 f.; cf. *Pyth.* 9.100 f.; *Nem.* 3.80 f.

<sup>22</sup> *Od.* 22.347-8. For Hesiod (*Theog.* 81 f.), the poet is he whom the Muses have honoured from his birth.

<sup>23</sup> See the index of A. Köhnken's book, *Die Funktion*

*des Mythos bei Pindar* (see p. 117 below), s.v. *Mühe*; cf. Bowra, *Pindar* 172 f.

<sup>24</sup> See *Nem.* 6.9 f.; 11.39 f.

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g., *Pyth.* 1.41 f.; cf. H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf*, 1935, 19; Bowra, *Pindar* 67.

<sup>26</sup> For the views taken in this section, see my book *The Justice of Zeus* (Sather Lectures vol. 41, 1971).

unique parentage. That solution she is able to impose by persuasion with a judicious modicum of threats; but the Erinyes are not defeated or dishonoured. Whether Aeschylus is 'for' or 'against' the reform of the Areopagus is not easily decided, nor is it, for our present purposes, particularly important; what matters is the firm insistence, strongly underlined by the close correspondence between the words of the Chorus in the central stasimon and Athene's charge to the Areopagus before they deliberate upon their verdict, that in the government of state and universe alike the element of 'what is formidable' is valuable and must always be preserved. The Athenians are assured, as they had been by Solon, that their city and her institutions will continue to flourish, through the favour of Athene; but they are by no means encouraged to imagine that this state of affairs will lead them to any sort of political or religious utopia. At the end of the Prometheus trilogy Zeus, in all probability, granted to mortals a share in justice in the form of the 'grace that comes by violence'. But Aeschylus did not forget that it is Zeus, and not Prometheus, who rules the universe. Like all Greek poets of the archaic and classical periods, he was well aware of the conditions of human life laid down by the gods; and he did not imagine that the people of his own city were exempt from them.

But Euripides, it will be argued, is surely quite a different case; he, with his comparatively numerous signs of acquaintance with contemporary science, philosophy and rhetoric, must be a rationalist and a progressive. Thirty years ago this view was very widely held; the first steps in undermining it were taken by Professor Dodds, in the famous article called 'Euripides the Irrationalist'.<sup>27</sup> If Euripides knows the views of modern thinkers, it does not follow that he wrote his plays to recommend them. Like Aeschylus and Sophocles, Euripides was a tragedian, concerned to present such conflicts as arise in the course of human life rather than to recommend his own solutions of contemporary problems. Divinity in his works, far from appearing as benevolent and understandable, is inscrutable and incalculable; the justice of the gods is done, but it is not the same as human justice. In essentials Euripides' general outlook on the world seems to me very close to that of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Nor do I find that, when allowance has been made for the difference of genre and poetical tradition, the world outlook of any of the tragedians is significantly different from that of Pindar. That is why the view that the tragedians must be superior, because they are more intelligent and more progressive, seems to me totally mistaken.

People fail to appreciate Pindar not only because they find him not to be progressive, but because they find him difficult. He is indeed difficult, but the nature of the difficulty is not always appreciated. His style and language present grave problems; but they are hardly as difficult as those of Sophocles, who is confidently read by many people who will not dare tackle Pindar. That would be the case even if Pindar's text were as corrupt as that of Sophocles, whereas in fact it is a good deal better preserved. The source of many of the greatest difficulties is not the language itself, nor the corruption of the text, but the conventions of the genre and the sometimes abrupt transitions from one topic to another which these entail. Many readers who can see the beauty of Pindar's style and language find it hard to read a Pindaric poem as a whole. We need to be taught how to read Pindar not only in the sense of how to construe him, but in that of how to view each poem and each section of each poem in the light of the tradition to which it belongs; and in this few books written in English are of much help to us.

How hard it is to understand the relation of each section of a Pindaric poem to the whole is shown by the controversies over 'the unity of the epinikion' which have continued since the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>28</sup> Throughout that period, it was generally

<sup>27</sup> *Cl. Rev.* 43, 1929, 97 f. = *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, 1973, 78 f.

<sup>28</sup> A useful, though sometimes tendentious survey

of the controversy is given by David C. Young, 'Pindaric Criticism', first published in the *Minnesota Review* 4, 1964, 584 f., and later reprinted with some

agreed that the epinikion was a unity; but many of the attempts to show in what the unity consisted were somewhat crude and arbitrary. Late in the century began the anti-unitarian reaction, whose main theorist was A. B. Drachmann<sup>29</sup> and whose main practical exponent was Wilamowitz. Drachmann argued that the traditional elements of the epinikion were too diverse to allow of its having any real unity; Wilamowitz in a series of publications extending from the treatment of the Sixth Olympian Ode in his *Isyllos von Epidauros* of 1886 to his *Pindaros* of 1922 analysed the poems on anti-unitarian lines.

Wilamowitz had set himself the vast task of surveying Greek civilization in its totality. He aspired to combine the tradition of exact interpretation of literary texts derived from Gottfried Hermann with the newer kind of scholarship, making use of monuments, inscriptions and the data of comparative linguistics as well as literary evidence, whose pioneers had been Boeckh, Welcker and Karl Otfried Müller. That Wilamowitz made a tremendous contribution to the understanding of Greek literature as well as other Greek studies is beyond dispute. Yet his approach, like that of all scholars, can be seen with the passage of time to have its limitations.<sup>29a</sup> Not all can feel sympathy with his robust brand of romanticism; and the historicism which so strongly conditioned his approach to the study of antiquity can now be seen to have its dangers.

'The century which lies between the Napoleonic wars and the Great War', said Professor Dodds in his inaugural lecture,<sup>30</sup> 'was, on the whole, dominated, despite important exceptions, by the ethic of romanticism'; the Oxford contemporary of Eliot and friend of Auden and MacNeice was one of the first English classical scholars to point out to his colleagues that this had ceased to be the case. The romantics held poetry, in particular lyric poetry, to be the spontaneous outpouring of the poet's true feelings; a genuine poet feels an overmastering urge to express in verse his own most genuinely held convictions. No wonder that the nature of poetical conventions, as Housman remarked with reference to textual interpretation, was better apprehended during the eighteenth than during the nineteenth century. Such conventions, the romantics thought, might be important for the understanding of the sophisticated verse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which they rejected; they found it hard to believe that they could be significant for the work of those Greek poets with whom they felt a special affinity, and for whose understanding they did so much. Even in the case of Horace romantic critics have had difficulty in appreciating the full importance of conventions; all too often they have taken as a personal statement what is simply the expression of a *locus communis*, and they have greatly exaggerated the value of the works as a source for the biography and personal attitudes and opinions of their author. Horace, one might suppose, is a writer in whose work the element of convention and sophistication cannot easily be underrated; yet this was done, and traces of the delusion can be seen even in the learned, intelligent and humane study of him by the late Eduard Fraenkel.<sup>31</sup> How much more excusable, and how much more misleading, is their misunderstanding of Catullus, an author they found it fatally easy to take for one of themselves! With early Greek lyric, likewise, the romantics felt a special affinity, by no means altogether without reason; how much better, in many ways, they understood both Greek lyric and Greek tragedy than had their immediate predecessors, or any generation since the revival of learning! Yet this very sympathy with the poets carried the germ of a serious misunderstanding. Pindar, who on the surface seems to have so little in common with

changes in W. M. Calder and J. Stern, *Pindar und Bakchylides* (Wege der Forschung 134), 1970, 1 f. See also ch. i of W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikions* (Schr. der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, 5. Jahr, Heft 3, 1928, 259 f., reprinted Darmstadt, 1966, and B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition Littéraire Grecque*, 2nd edn., 1960, 331 f.

<sup>29</sup> *Moderne Pindarfortolkning*, 1891.

<sup>29a</sup> See U. Hölscher, *Die Chance des Unbehagens*, 1965.

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 1, p. 16.

<sup>31</sup> *Horace*, 1957; contrast the introduction of R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard to their commentary on Book 1 of the Odes, 1970, and see G. W. Williams, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 56, 1972, 432-3.

sophisticated poets like Horace or Pope and so much with the lyric poets of the romantic age, was bound to be distorted by a romantic interpretation.

Hardly less powerful than the distorting influence of romanticism was that of historicism. Wilamowitz and his contemporaries insisted that a poem was as much a historical document as a historical work, an inscription or a moment; so it is, provided that even in assessing its value as historical evidence one takes proper account of its artistic character and purpose. In the climate generated by the historicism of the nineteenth century, it was dangerously easy to try to extract from a poem more in the way of historical information than its actual content justified.

Even now, fifty years after its first appearance, Wilamowitz' *Pindaros* is an exciting book to read. Like all his works, particularly those of his astonishing last decade, it is full of life and colour; the author's comprehensive learning often brings illumination; and many of the new interpretations he advanced in it still hold their ground. Its influence has been enormous. Despite its element of Crocean aestheticism, Gennaro Parrotta's *Safò e Pindaro* (1935) is dominated by Wilamowitz; and Sir Maurice Bowra's *Pindar* (1964) moves almost entirely within the lines which Wilamowitz marked out. An important advance was made by Wolfgang Schadewaldt, who in 1928 published a study of the various recurrent elements in the epinikion and the way in which they are combined;<sup>32</sup> Illig<sup>33</sup> did much to illuminate Pindar's narrative technique; and Hermann Fränkel in the course of a series of brilliant interpretations<sup>34</sup> has made a specially valuable contribution to the understanding of Pindar's religious outlook; all three, like Bruno Snell,<sup>35</sup> adopt in general an approach like that of Wilamowitz. An attempt to demonstrate the unity of the epinikion in terms of a more or less hazily conceived 'symbolism' has been in my judgment notably unsuccessful; from the works of G. Norwood<sup>36</sup> and his followers most readers have returned despairingly to the anti-unitarians.

A trend which is immeasurably more interesting than that begun by Norwood started in 1962 with the publication of detailed studies of the Eleventh Olympian and First Isthmian Odes<sup>37</sup> by Elroy L. Bundy, a professor in the University of California at Berkeley. Bundy strongly insisted on the importance of understanding the conventions of epinician poetry, and supported his contention by showing in the chosen poems how often a *locus communis* may be shown to occur at corresponding places in different poems, but in corresponding places and with a similar function. The somewhat formidable technical terminology which he has invented to indicate the special purposes of each formal device is curiously reminiscent of the edition published at Wittenberg in 1616 by Erasmus Schmid, who analysed the odes in terms of the categories prescribed in the rhetorical handbooks of the imperial period. Bundy sharply reminded his readers that the main purpose of an epinician ode is to praise the victor in whose honour it is written; and he emphatically warned them against taking it for granted that all or most difficulties of interpretation are to be explained by supposing the existence of a personal or historical allusion.

Since 1962 Bundy has most unfortunately published nothing; but his methods have been applied, with varying degrees of fidelity, by a number of followers. David C. Young has written a valuable sketch of the history of Pindaric criticism,<sup>38</sup> and has applied his own

<sup>32</sup> See n. 28.

<sup>33</sup> L. Illig, *Zur form der Pindarischen Erzählung*, 1932.

<sup>34</sup> See the work quoted in n. 15, 483 f.; cf. 'Pindars Religion'; *Die Antike*, 3, 1927, 39 f. = Calder and Stern, *op. cit.* in n. 28, 232 f., and his review of Schadewaldt, *Gnomon* 6, 1930, 1 f. = *Wege und Formen des frühgriechischen Denkens*, 2nd ed., 1960, 350 f.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 10, 118 f.

<sup>36</sup> *Pindar* (Sather Classical Lectures, vol. 19), 1945.

<sup>37</sup> *Studia Pindarica*: I, *The Eleventh Olympian Ode*; II,

*The First Isthmian Ode* (*Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology*, vol. 18, nos. 1 and 2, 1962).

<sup>38</sup> See n. 28. In passing, let me inform the learned author of something that will give him pleasure. He complains (see Calder and Stern, *op. cit.* in n. 28, p. 52) that only the Italian reviews of F. Dornseiff's *Pindars Stil* of 1921 were unfavourable. He should see the review of P. Maas in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 16, 1922, 407 f. for a judgment closely in accordance with his own.



principles in four detailed studies of individual odes.<sup>39</sup> Young combines a modified version of Bundy's approach with more questionable elements derived from the school of symbolists that springs from Norwood. Erich Thummer in his commentary on the Isthmian Odes<sup>40</sup> has applied, I fear somewhat mechanically, principles like those of Bundy; he has prefaced to the work a useful collection of *loci communes* arranged under general headings. W. J. Slater, the author of a valuable new Pindaric lexicon, has offered some detailed interpretations on Bundy's lines, mostly useful but at times exaggerated.<sup>41</sup> Adolf Köhnken has shown that the advice on kingship given in the last part of the First Pythian Ode is offered not to the young Deinomenes but to the mature Hieron;<sup>42</sup> since Hesiod's time, at least, it had been a convention that a poet, inspired by the Muses, might address a ruler in such a tone without impertinence. The same writer has set out to show how the myths of six epinician odes can be shown, on Bundyite principles, to subserve the unity of the whole, and has carried through the work with considerable success.<sup>43</sup>

Bundy has beyond doubt done an immense service to the understanding of Pindar by reemphasising the importance of convention in Pindaric art, by warning us against the naive romantic assumption that lyric poetry must involve unreserved self-revelation, and by exposing as gratuitous assumptions a number of supposed allusions invented by scholars in order to explain the difficulties of the text. At the same time, it is possible to pursue this approach too far, as some of Bundy's followers have already shown. The Ariadne's clue to the understanding of an epinician ode is, as Bundy has insisted, the realisation that its main purpose is to praise the victor. But the victors whom Pindar celebrated lived at a particular time in a particular society. Each had his own place in that society and in the history of that time; some held an important place there. It was therefore inevitable that some echo of events in that world should be found in Pindar's poetry. Many of his historical allusions are acknowledged facts, as no serious scholar would dispute; and it is natural that there should be others whose existence, owing to the poverty of our information, are not so easy to demonstrate. In some cases Bundy's followers have gone too far. Like most new approaches to the study of great poetry, the new approach to Pindar does not offer by itself a key to the solution of all difficulties; rather, it must be judiciously combined with other principles and other methods. The recognition that certain *loci communes* recur at frequent intervals in choral lyric, as in other Greek poetry, must not encourage people to suppose that Pindar, any more than other Greek poets, automatically strung together a selection of 'formulae', a word which should be carefully avoided in this connection. We should indeed guard against assuming that the poetic personality that appears in Pindar's writings corresponds at all points with the poet's private character; and we should be more hesitant than our predecessors when it comes to explaining difficulties in the poems by means of factual assumptions resting on no other evidence. But we should not forget that Pindar was a human being writing for other human beings in a particular and individual historical and social environment. We can best elucidate and appreciate the poet's art by using our understanding of his principles of composition to see how he applies these principles in the special circumstances offered by a given context.

So let us turn to the most puzzling of the Sicilian odes, the Second Pythian. Its occasion and its date are wrapped in mystery.<sup>44</sup> Aristophanes<sup>45</sup> of Byzantium placed it among the

<sup>39</sup> *Three Odes of Pindar: A literary Study of Pythian 11, Pythian 3 and Olympian 7* (*Mnemosyne*, suppl. 9, 1968; admirably reviewed by H. Maehler, *Gnomon* 42, 1970, 441 f.); *Pindar, Isthmian 7, Myth and Exempla* (*Mnemosyne*, suppl. 15, 1971).

<sup>40</sup> *Pindar: Die Isthmischen Gedichte*, 2 vols., 1968; M. M. Willcock, *Cl. Rev.* 21, 1971, 336, supplies an interesting review, though he might have pointed out more of the mistakes the book contains.

<sup>41</sup> *Cl. Quart.* 19, 1969, 86 f.

<sup>42</sup> *Hermes* 98, 1970, 1 f.

<sup>43</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 23.

<sup>44</sup> The best statement of the problems is that of P. Von der Mühl, *Mus. Helv.* 15, fasc. 4, 1958, 215 f. 'Dici vix potest quantum in eo expediendo laboraverint interpretes', wrote Hermann of this poem in 1834 (*Opuscula* VII, 115).

<sup>45</sup> For the opinions of ancient scholars, see A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, vol. II

Pythian Odes, and Apollonius the Eidographer followed him; but there is no certainty that it belongs there. Callimachus, perhaps following Zenodotus, called it a Nemean; perhaps he meant that it belonged with the group of *κεχωρισμένα*, or unclassified odes, that stood at the end of the Nemeans in the ancient editions. Callistratus, the pupil of Aristophanes, called it an Olympian; so did Ammonius, the pupil of Apollonius. Timaeus called<sup>46</sup> it a *θυσιαστική*, or a *θυσιαστήριος*, meaning, I suppose, an ode designed to accompany a sacrifice.

The poem celebrates a victory of Hieron in a chariot race. Von der Mühl, it is true, has argued<sup>47</sup> that because Artemis and Hermes are said (9 f.) to give Hieron glory whenever he yokes his horses, therefore this ode celebrates no definite occasion, but merely praises Hieron because he is always victorious. But the claim (4) to bring news of 'the earth-shaking four-in-hand', the statement (6) that Hieron has crowned Ortygia and the specific pronoun *κείνας* in the phrase 'those mares with flashing reins' (7) all help to show that this was no exception to the general rule that an epinician ode celebrates a victory. But what victory?

The only victories in chariot races at the great Panhellenic Games which we know Hieron to have won were won at the Pythian Games of 470 and at the Olympic Games of 468. Some scholars have thought that this ode celebrated a victory which was not won at the Panhellenic Games at all. Boeckh<sup>48</sup> thought it was won at the Iolaeia at Thebes, and found many to agree with him; Farnell<sup>49</sup> thought of local games at Syracuse. Such suggestions cannot be refuted, any more than they can be established; though the manner in which the victory is spoken of hardly suggests a minor occasion. Wilamowitz<sup>50</sup> and Schadewaldt<sup>51</sup> held that this poem, like the First Pythian Ode, celebrated the Pythian victory of Hieron's chariot in 470. D. S. Robertson<sup>52</sup> suggested that it was written to honour Hieron's Olympic chariot victory of 468, praised in the third ode of Bacchylides; Bowra<sup>53</sup> by a different set of arguments reached the same conclusion.

There has been similar uncertainty about the date. Boeckh put the poem as early as 477; Schroeder<sup>54</sup> hesitated between 475 and 471; Von der Mühl argued for 475; Wilamowitz and his followers, like Robertson and Bowra, placed it later, as their view of the occasion demanded.

The content of the poem also has been the subject of controversy. The exact significance of the myth of Ixion has been debated; but there has been even more dispute over the last part of the poem, from l. 72 to the end. Most modern scholars regard it as a remonstrance addressed to Hieron, who is exhorted not to believe certain persons who have slandered the poet at his court; some have agreed with the ancient commentators that these persons must have been rival poets. Instead of recording the various opinions which have been expressed, I wish to examine the text, section by section, and while guarding against excessive confidence in this or any other single line of approach, to use as a clue the principle reaffirmed by Bundy that an encomium is designed, in the last resort, to praise the victor.

'Syracuse of the mighty city, precinct of Ares mighty in war, nurse divine of men and horses that delight in iron, to you I come from bright Thebes, bringing this song, bearing news of the earth-shaking four-in-hand in which Hieron, mighty charioteer, crowned Ortygia with a garland that shines from far—Ortygia, seat of Artemis of the river, with whose aid he tamed with gentle hands those mares with flashing reins. For the archer

(*Scholia in Pythionicas*), p. 31; for the contributions of the scholars named to Pindaric scholarship, see J. Irigoin, *Histoire du texte de Pindare*, 1952, chs. iv–vii and R. Pfeiffer, *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the Hellenistic Age*, 1968, svv.

<sup>46</sup> *FGrH* 566 F 141.

<sup>47</sup> *Loc. cit.* (in n. 44 above), 220.

<sup>48</sup> See his commentary, *ad loc.*

<sup>49</sup> II 119. P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 1972,

I 452, asserts as though it were a known fact that the ode was written to honour a success in local games.

<sup>50</sup> *Pindaros*, 1922, 285 f.

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.* (in n. 1 above), 325 f. = 67 f.

<sup>52</sup> *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 127–9, 1924, 35.

<sup>53</sup> *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 48, 1937, 1 f. = *Problems in Greek Poetry*, 1953, 66 f.; cf. *Pindar*, 1964, 410. <sup>54</sup> *Pindars Pythien*, 1922, 1–3.

maiden and Hermes of the contest with both hands give him radiant glory, when he yokes the might of his horses to the polished seat and to the chariot that guides the bridle,<sup>55</sup> calling upon the mighty god who wields the trident' (1-13).

It is worth remarking that this praise of Syracusan valour leaves little to be said for the argument that the absence of any direct reference to the victories of Himera and Cumae indicates an early date. Next we may notice that Pindar's home was Thebes, so that his sending his poem from Thebes does not prove that the victory it celebrates was won there. Hieron's home was Syracuse, and his crowning of Ortygia does not show, as Farnell imagined, that his victory was won at Syracuse. The poem was written, it would appear, in honour of a specific victory; but where or when that victory was won, neither the prologue nor any other part of it gives us any means of knowing. In the absence of anything like adequate evidence, I would prefer to suspend judgment, a thing Pindaric scholars do too seldom in matters of chronology.<sup>55a</sup> Schadewaldt, who follows Wilamowitz in taking the poem to be not an epinikion in the strict sense but a poetical epistle, thinks Pindar felt obliged to give it the standard form of an epinikion.<sup>56</sup> I do not see how Schadewaldt knows that it is a poetical epistle, and not an epinikion proper.

Hieron himself, the poet says, trained the horses. Does that point to a time in his life before he became afflicted with the stone and other troubles? It would be unwise to deny that royal persons in ancient Syracuse, as in modern England, may have occupied themselves with such matters. But it would be equally unwise to rule out the possibility that Pindar may have spoken of Hieron as having trained the horses, even though he had taken little or no part in their training;<sup>57</sup> so that I see no evidence for dating here.

The poem continues: 'Different men have wrought for different kings a sweet song to reward their prowess' (14-5). That is a transitional formula of a kind often used by Pindar;<sup>58</sup> but it also touches directly on the theme of gratitude which lies at the heart of the poem. First comes the example of Cinyras as a good man rewarded by the praise which he deserves; then follows the similar example of Hieron. 'Often the voices of the Cyprians resound in praise of Cinyras, whom golden-haired Apollo loved, the favoured priest<sup>59</sup> of Aphrodite; it is gratitude, I think, in regard<sup>60</sup> for some kindly action, that impels them. And you, son of Deinomenes, the maiden of Locris in the west sings of before her house,<sup>61</sup> she who after desperate struggles in war through your might has cast her first untroubled glance' (15-20).

<sup>55</sup> On the sense of *πεισιχάλινα*, see D. S. Robertson, *Studi in onore di L. Castiglioni* II, 1960, 801 f.

<sup>55a</sup> I suspect that Robertson and Bowra are right about the occasion, but do not think their arguments amount to proof.

<sup>56</sup> *Loc. cit.* 326-8 = 68 = 70.

<sup>57</sup> Wilamowitz changed his mind over this question, as Eduard Fraenkel, *Horace*, 1957, 172 n. 3 pointed out.

<sup>58</sup> See Bundy, *SP* 1.7 f.

<sup>59</sup> In an ingenious article (*RCCM* 2, 1960, 30 f.), Anna Morpurgo Davies argued that at 1.17 the word *κύριος* meant not 'pet' or 'favourite', as is usually supposed, but 'ram', as in its earliest instances. A ram has a place in the cult of Carneian Apollo, but none in that of Paphian Aphrodite; a sacred animal in that cult would be, I regret to say, the pig. Even if Hesiod *fr.* 323 Merkelbach-West is regarded as a doubtful instance, the sense 'tame' is as early as Empedocles (B 130, 1. Diels-Kranz).

<sup>60</sup> *δουζόμενα* is middle; see H. Gundert, *op. cit.* in n. 25, p. 141, n. 364.

<sup>61</sup> Does *πρὸ δόμων* refer to the singer's house, or to Hieron's? and what kind of occasion is envisaged? Satyrus, *On the Demes of Alexandria*, P. Oxy. 2465, r. 2, col. ii, 12 f.), giving directions for procedure on the occasion of a religious procession in honour of the goddess Arsinoe Philadelphos, writes: *οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι θύειν Ἀρσιν[ό]φι φιλα-|δέ]λφωι θυέτωσαν πρὸ τῶν ἰδ[ί]ων οἰ-|κων ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν [δω]μάτων. . . .* The restoration *ἰδ[ί]ων οἰ[κ]ων* is due to W. Morel (ap. Lloyd-Jones, *Gnomon* 35, 1963, 453) who compares Chariton 3.2.15 (in a similar context) *ἔθνευ ἕκαστος πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας οἰκίας*; one might also compare Euripides, *Bacch.* 68-70, where Dodds is surely right to punctuate *τίς δῶι τίς δῶι; τίς μελάθροις*; (cf. A. J. Festugière, *Mus. Helv.* 9, 1952, 244, cited on p. 75 of the second edition of Dodds' commentary). These passages seem to suggest that the house may be the singer's own, and that the occasion envisaged may be that of some kind of religious procession, perhaps resembling the performance of one of Pindar's own poems. The scholastic have *προεθούσα . . . τῶν οἰκων*, rightly.

Cinyras, the Cyprian king mentioned in the Iliad as a guest-friend of Agamemnon, was proverbial for his wealth.<sup>62</sup> That is why he is mentioned at *Nem.* 8, 18. That and the favour shown him by Apollo, who in one place is said to have been his father,<sup>63</sup> make him a specially apt instance here. But as the text shows he is mentioned as a benefactor who has received his due reward in praise.

Then follows an unmistakable historical allusion. But what gratitude of the Locrians to Hieron does the poet have in mind? According to a scholion on the passage,<sup>64</sup> the Locrians had been threatened by Anaxilas of Rhegium, and Hieron had sent his brother-in-law Chromios to warn him off. This event would have to lie between Hieron's accession to power in 478 and Anaxilas' death in 476; it is usually placed in 477.<sup>65</sup> Those who have believed the scholion and have assumed that the allusion must be to a recent event have found here evidence for a date about 476. But Robertson<sup>66</sup> has pointed out that there was another occasion on which Hieron came to the help of the Locrians. A scholion on l.38 says that the Locrians were threatened by the tyrants Anaxilas and Kleophon, but were saved by Hieron. Now according to Justin (21.3) the Locrians were once attacked by Leophon, tyrant of Rhegium; so that the Kleophon of the scholion is presumably the son and successor of Anaxilas. Diodorus (I, 66) places the restoration of the sons of Anaxilas not long before Hieron's death in 467/6; but the chronological inexactitude of Diodorus is notorious. Robertson thought Leophon's attack on Locri took place in 471 or 470. There is a third possible explanation. Hieron's saving of the Locrians from Anaxilas is known to us only from the scholion I have mentioned and from another on *Pyth.* I, 98;<sup>67</sup> the latter cites no historian as his authority, but the comic poet Epicharmus in his *Nasoi* (*fr.* 98 Kaibel). But even if this is the truth, Pindar may have had no such thing in mind. Like all the inhabitants of South Italy and Sicily, the Locrians had good reason to be grateful to the conqueror of the Etruscans at Cumae in 474. Why should the Locrian maiden be specified? Locri was a home of poets, as the poet of the Tenth Olympian was aware.<sup>68</sup> Can we be sure that it was not this great achievement that the Locrian maiden praised? It might have been the theme of poets for many years after its occurrence. To sum up, the allusion to Locrian songs in praise of Hieron is uncertain, and its value in dating the poem very limited.

Now follows the myth of Ixion (21 f.): 'And by the command of the gods, they say, Ixion speaks these words to mortals as he whirls every way on the flying wheel: "Requite your benefactor with a kind return and do him honour." He learned this in truth; for after he had attained a pleasant life with the children of Kronos, he could not long sustain his happiness, when with mind deranged he desired Hera, who is set apart for the mighty joys of Zeus' bed; but pride drove him to arrogant folly; and soon he suffered what he deserved and got trouble beyond that of others. Two crimes brought him grief; he was the first hero to introduce among mortals the shedding of kindred blood, not without treachery; and once in the capacious chambers of Zeus he attempted Hera!'<sup>69</sup>

I cannot agree with the scholar who a few years ago argued that Ixion is not imagined

<sup>62</sup> *Il.* 11.19 f.; *cf.* Tyrtaeus 9.6.

<sup>63</sup> Σ Theocritus 1.109. His connection with Apollo may have arisen from his name. Eustathius on *Il. loc. cit.* derives it from the Hebrew word for 'harp', but a Greek would naturally have thought of *κινυρός*, etc.

<sup>64</sup> Drachmann, *op. cit.* (in n. 29), p. 37.

<sup>65</sup> E.g., by H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*, I, 1967, 150.

<sup>66</sup> *Op. cit.* (in n. 52).

<sup>67</sup> *Op. cit.* (in n. 45), p. 18.

<sup>68</sup> See *Ol.* 10.14; *fr.* 140b, 1-6; for the alleged

Locrian origin of Stesichorus, and for the Locrian poet Xenocritus, see C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, 2nd edn., 1961, 82-4.

<sup>69</sup> We may notice in the passage the regular vocabulary of the concepts of Hybris and Ate: *ἔμαθε* (*cf.* Homer's *παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω* and Aeschylus *πάθει μάθος*; see, if documentation is needed, H. Dörrie, *Abh. Mainz. Akad.*, 1936, no. 5, 307 f.): *μανωμέναις φρασίν: ὕβρις* drives Ixion to *ἄτη: παθὼν εὐκότα*. As in Aeschylus' trilogy about him, Ixion figures as an example of ingratitude punished by the justice of Zeus.

as speaking these words, but merely as bringing them to mind by his example.<sup>70</sup> Virgil is explicit in the similar case of Phlegyas (*Aen.* 6.18 f.):

Phlegyasque miserrimus omnis  
admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras:  
'discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos'.

Heyne thought that Virgil had this passage of Pindar in mind;<sup>71</sup> certainly it is an instance of the same *locus communis*. The words Ixion utters illustrate a common theme in Pindar, that of the duty to show gratitude and the criminality of ingratitude; Bundy<sup>72</sup> has exhaustively catalogued the instances.

A subsidiary gnome—what Bundy would call a 'gnomic foil'—follows next (34 f.). 'A man should look on the measure of all things at his own level. His lawless coupling cast him into all kinds of misfortune; he too was the victim of such actions;<sup>73</sup> for in ignorance the man lay with a cloud, embracing a sweet falsehood. In shape it was like the daughter of Kronos, matchless among the heavenly ones; the hands of Zeus made it to ensnare him, a beautiful cause of disaster. He brought on himself his binding to the four-spoked wheel, his own destruction; in fetters not to be escaped from he received the message that comes to all. Remote from the Graces, she bore him an arrogant son, solitary, like his mother, having no honour among men or in the realm of the gods; she reared him and called him Centaur.<sup>74</sup> He mated with Magnesian horses on the spurs of Pelion, and there was born a horde prodigious, like both parents, like the mother below, but above like the father.'

Schadewaldt, after Hermann and others, has admirably shown how the myth of Ixion illustrates the motive of ingratitude, the omnipotence of Zeus, and the inevitable punishment of the ungrateful man by Zeus' justice; I need not repeat what he has said.<sup>75</sup> What follows will show that in this poem the myth is perfectly appropriate to the central theme.

The power of the gods that is attested by any prodigious thing or happening supplies a transitional formula very often used by Pindar.<sup>76</sup> 'The god accomplishes his every purpose in accordance with his hopes, the god who catches the winged eagle and passes the dolphin of the sea, and makes a proud mortal bow, while to others he gives success<sup>77</sup> that never grows old' (49 f.).

Then follows what seems an abrupt transition to a more perplexing passage (53 f.). 'But I must avoid the sharp tooth of slander. For I have seen from far off the scolding Archilochus in perplexity grow fat upon abusive enmities; and to be wealthy while one attains one's proper fate is the best thing wisdom offers.'

<sup>70</sup> D. Kuijper, *Mnemosyne* 16, 1963, 162 f.

<sup>71</sup> On Virgil's knowledge of Pindar, see Lloyd-Jones, *Maia* fasc. 3, anno 19, 1967, 229; Eduard Fraenkel pointed out to me that my warning against underestimating the width of Virgil's reading echoed his own at *Philol.* 87, 1932, 247-8 = *Kleine Beiträge zur kl. Philologie* II 178-9. See A. Seidel, *De Vergilii studiis Pindaricis*, Diss. Breslau, 1925; cf. L. P. Wilkinson, *Forschungen zur römischen Literatur*, Festschrift Büchner, 1970, 286 f.

<sup>72</sup> *Op. cit.* (in n. 37), II 86-91.

<sup>73</sup> The passage has perplexed commentators; see, e.g., G. Tarditi, *La Parola del Passato*, II, 1956, 197 (whose own suggestion does not convince). But Snell and Turyn rightly read *ποτὶ καὶ τὸν Ἴκοντ'*. The iota is shortened by the omission of the augment, and the sense of *Ἴκοντ'* is that listed under II 2 in *LSJ* s.v. *ἰκνέομαι*, in which anger, suffering and

other undesirable things are said to 'come upon' or 'visit' people. The *καὶ* is like that in such phrases as *οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον* (*Od.* 21.295); cf. *Pyth.* 3.55.

<sup>74</sup> P. Von der Mühl, *Mus. Helv.* 25, 1968, 221, showed that Pindar derived *Κένταυρος* from *κεντεῖν* and *αἶρα*. On the significance of the myth of the centaurs, see G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Sather Classical Lectures, vol. 40), 1970, 132 f.

<sup>75</sup> *Op. cit.* (in n. 28), 328-30 = 70-2; following Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 289, he draws attention to the echo of the prelude of Hesiod's *Works and Days* here; cf. Young, *Pindar, Isthmian* 7 (cited in n. 39), 37, n. 125. J. Martin, *REG* 82, 1969, thinks that Pindar is urging Hieron not to behave like Ixion.

<sup>76</sup> See Bundy, *SP* I 2-3, 9-11.

<sup>77</sup> *κῦδος* means rather more than 'fame'; see H. Fränkel, *Wege u. Formen* (cited in n. 34), 71, n. 2.

In considering the relevance of this to what precedes it, we must start from the word *χρεών* in l.53. Bundy speaks of 'the countless appeals to propriety in introductions, transitions and conclusions', and adds that all such words and phrases attach to the laudator's *χρέος* and to the appropriate manner of discharging it' (*SP* II 73). Why does the poet say that he must avoid evil-speaking? Evil-speaking is the opposite of praise; doers of good like Cinyras and Hieron deserve gratitude, of which praise is a manifestation.<sup>78</sup> Pindar must not be like Archilochus, a great poet of the past who savagely abused his enemies. A famous passage of Archilochus runs, 'My heart, my heart, confounded by perplexing cares, . . . take your stand opposite the enemy and defend yourself against your foe'.<sup>79</sup> Archilochus, then, is mentioned because of his attacks upon his enemies; but how can Pindar then go on to say, just as he does at the beginning of the Fifth Pythian Ode, that wealth when it is granted by divine will and not gained unjustly is the best thing wisdom has to offer? That translation of the difficult l.56 has not, it is true, been accepted by all scholars; but it is certainly recommended by the order of the words, as Eduard Fraenkel with his special expertise in word order pointed out.<sup>80</sup> The clue to the transition lies in the word *παινώμενον*, which must in this contest imply not simply that Archilochus had many enemies, but that he made money or somehow profited, out of his enmities.<sup>81</sup> Whether Archilochus made money from his poetry is uncertain; Pindar certainly did, and may have assumed that Archilochus did the same; at least Archilochus utilised his enmities for the purposes of his poetry. The nature of the context enjoins this interpretation, which well suits the natural meaning of the verb. Archilochus, then, is introduced as an instance of an evil-speaker, but the transition from him to Hieron is managed by contrasting the source from which they derive their wealth or profits.

We come to Hieron for the section of the poem that contains the main laudation of the victor<sup>82</sup> (56 f.). 'You can in truth point to this with your generous mind, lord who commands many well-walled cities and their people.<sup>83</sup> And if anyone says that any other in Greece among those before him was greater in his possessions or in his honour,<sup>84</sup> he struggles unavailingly with empty mind. I will embark in a garlanded vessel<sup>85</sup> as I proclaim his excellence. The support of youth is valour in grievous wars; and from this also I say you won boundless glory, battling among the charging cavalry and among foot-soldiers; and the counsels of riper age allow me without hazard to praise you on every count.'

Many modern scholars seem to believe that to enumerate the triumphs of the victor and to praise him was for Pindar a disagreeable necessity, to be got over as quickly as possible. It is the great merit of Bundy to have reminded us that in an epinician ode the praise of the victor must be of central importance. Here this solemn praise is uttered with reference to

<sup>78</sup> Bundy, *SP* II.56 f. illustrates this common notion; with *Isthm.* 1.41–51 he compares *Isthm.* 5.24–32; see also Bacchylides 5.187–97 (cited by him on p. 60), *Pyth.* 9.96–9 and *Nem.* 7.61 f.

<sup>79</sup> *Fr.* 128 West; P. Friedländer ap. Gundert, *op. cit.* (in n. 25), 141, n. 367, thought Pindar had this in mind when he wrote these words.

<sup>80</sup> Ap. Schadewaldt, *op. cit.* (in n. 28), 72–3, n. 2. D. Gerber in a learned article has argued for this view (*TAPA* 91, 1960, 100 f.). R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes*, 1962, 120, thinks that *σοφία* here must mean poetry; that would remove the point of contrast between Archilochus and Hieron. The same prejudice that 'Pindar seldom, if ever, uses the word to mean wisdom in a general sense' has been responsible for the repeated misinterpretation of *Nem.* 17.17, where *σοφοί* means not 'poets' but 'wise men who are willing to pay poets to preserve their fame'; see n. 118 below.

<sup>81</sup> A wrong interpretation of *παινώμενον* has often been defended by citing Bacchylides 3.68, where a pi was written by the second corrector against the verb in the clause *δοσις μὴ φθόνοι παινέται*. But there too it is presumably implied that the envious profit from their envy, unless H. Richards and J. Schöne were right to read *φιλάνεται*.

<sup>82</sup> In Bundy's terminology the 'crescendo'; see *SP* I 17.

<sup>83</sup> To infer anything about the date of the poem from this manner of addressing Hieron strikes me as most unreasonable; but Burton, *op. cit.* (n. 80), I 15 follows Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 1922, 285.

<sup>84</sup> For this kind of solemn asseveration, see Bundy, *SP* II, 59, n. 60.

<sup>85</sup> Ships were, on festal occasions, decorated with flowers; see L. Deubner, *ARW* 30, 1933, 73, and F. Bömer, *Ovids Fasten* II, p. 42.

a principle which Pindar in his works enunciates in various ways and amplifies with various details; that if a man has wealth and also *arete*, if he has wealth which is not ill-gotten, but is his by the will of the gods, then he deserves glory, which it is the duty of other men not to grudge him and the task of the poet to perpetuate. Hieron has wealth, honourably won; in wealth and honour, he is unsurpassed. In praise of his *aretē*, the poet will set out on a voyage on a ship whose prow is garlanded; Hieron has the proverbial combination of valour in war and wisdom in counsel; therefore, his glory is deserved and the poet's task in celebrating it is easy.

At this point Pindar wishes the victor well; he says *χαῖρε*. This word can mean 'Farewell' as well as 'Fare well', and since less than ten lines from the end of the Third Nemean Pindar similarly salutes Aristoclide, it has been argued that the real end of the ode comes here, and that ll.72-96 are a kind of appendix. The passage of the Third Nemean<sup>86</sup> that is in question is like this in more ways than one. There too the poet tells the victor he is sending him his poem; there too he describes it, mentioning that it is in Aeolic measure; in the Nemean the *aulos*, in the Pythian the *phorminx* is to accompany the performance. In the Nemean an apology for lateness in delivery leads the poet to contrast himself, the eagle, with the chattering daws, before uttering his final praise of the victor's glory. In the Second Pythian also the poet after saluting the victor contrasts himself—in this case in the character of the honest man, the straight speaker—with others, this time the flatterers and deceivers. The eagle and the daws occupy three or four lines, the straight speaker and the deceivers twenty-four; but I do not think that the difference in length between the two passages need be specially significant.

'This song I am sending over the gray sea, like Phoenician merchandise;<sup>87</sup> graciously look upon the Castor-song in Aeolian strains, granting it favour for the sake of the seven-stringed lyre' (68 f.). What does Pindar mean by *Καστόρειον*? The same term seems to be employed in the First Isthmian (17), where Pindar wishes to celebrate Herodotus in a Kastoreion or a hymn for Iolaus. Castor and Polydeuces are commonly connected with horses and with chariots, so that it seems reasonable to suppose that a Castor-song was one in honour of a victory in a horse-race or a chariot-race, and to compare *Ol. I*, 102, 'I must crown him with a horse-melody in Aeolic song'.<sup>88</sup> The term 'Aeolic' (for which compare also *Nem.* 3, 79) will refer not to the metre, but the music.<sup>89</sup> It seems, then, that this description could apply to any poem in honour of a horse-race or a chariot-race. But which poem does Pindar mean?

The ancient commentary says that he meant an hyporcheme, from which we have more than one quotation.<sup>90</sup> Is this a mere guess, or does the commentator speak from knowledge? We cannot be certain. Some moderns have thought he meant the First Pythian, others the First Olympian; such suggestions cannot be confirmed, but neither can they be refuted. Several scholars have maintained that it is the Second Pythian Ode itself. Gildersleeve, no mean grammarian, warns us that 'Pindar's use of *μέν* and *δέ* is so tricky that the Kastoreion is not necessarily different' from the Second Pythian. We cannot be sure that he is wrong; and the comparison with *Nem.* 3, 76 f. made above might encourage a believer in his view.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>86</sup> χαῖρε, φίλος. ἐγὼ τὸδε τοι  
πέμπω μεμυγμένον μέλι λευκῶι  
σὺν γάλακτι, κίρναμένα δ' ἔερσ' ἀμφέπει,  
πόμ' ἀοιδίμον Αἰολίσσιν ἐν προαΐσιν ἀδλῶν,  
ὄψε περ. ἔστι δ' αἰετὸς ἄκνυς ἐν ποτανοῖς,  
ὃς ἔλαβεν αἶψα, τηλόθε μεταμαυόμενος,  
δαφινὸν ἄγραν ποσίν.

κραγεταὶ δὲ κολοιοὶ ταπεινὰ νέμονται.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 5.3.

<sup>88</sup> Plutarch's statement (*Vita Lycurgi* 22) that a Kastoreion was a Spartan marching-song played on the *aulos* is not necessarily relevant to a Kastoreion as Pindar uses the term.

<sup>89</sup> See M. I. Henderson, *Oxford History of Music*, I, 1957, 382-4. We cannot know whether the linguistic Aeolisms detected in the poem (see B. Forssman, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache Pindars*, 1966, 13-20) have anything to do with its allegedly Aeolic character.

<sup>90</sup> *Fr.* 105 Snell = 121 Turyn.

<sup>91</sup> Heyne, Boeckh, Christ and Schroeder in their commentaries, Von der Mühl, *Rh. Mus.* 72, 1918, 307 and art. cit. (in n. 44), 218, n. 13 and B. Forssman *op. cit.* (in n. 89), 19 f. are among those who have agreed with him.

This brings us to the concluding passage which has been the cause of so much controversy. Pindar has asked Hieron to give a gracious reception to his poem or poems. He goes on to say, 'Be such as you are according to my words'.<sup>92</sup> Instead of adding to the lengthy discussion of this sentence, I shall simply say that I see no difficulty in taking οἶος ἐσσῑ to go with μαθῶν as well as with γένοιο. Pindar has praised Hieron; let Hieron now reveal in action the character the poet has described. The word μαθῶν does not imply that without Pindar's description Hieron would not have known his own character; it means much the same as ἀκούσας would mean in this context. We should guard against assuming that Pindar thinks that without his exhortation Hieron would not behave nobly. Hieron always does behave nobly (cf. *Pyth.* I, 86 f.).<sup>92a</sup>

From the mention of Hieron's noble nature, Pindar goes on to distinguish between immature minds, whose sense of values is perverted, and the sound judgment of the ripe intelligence. 'An ape is ever<sup>92b</sup> handsome among children, handsome; but Rhadamanthys enjoys happiness, because he has reaped the blameless harvest of his good sense, and takes no joy in deceptions in his heart within him, such joy as comes ever to a mortal through the schemes of whisperers. A plague irresistible to both sides are the speakers of slanders, like altogether to the character of foxes' (73 f.).

Is the monkey mentioned because of its imitations, suggesting the behaviour of flatterers, or because of its tricks? We do not need to ask this question. Pindar says that children think a monkey handsome; clearly the point of the contrast between them and Rhadamanthys is that a mature intelligence sees things as they are and judges rightly. But we are told that Rhadamanthys takes no joy in deceptions; such joy comes through the schemes of whisperers; and they are slanderers, who resemble foxes. Many scholars have assumed that Hieron is being warned not to believe slanderers; but this is only a very indirect inference from the text before us. The just and wise man, of whom Rhadamanthys in the type, has been contrasted with the slanderer; and this is the theme on which the poet now dilates.

L. 78 as it is transmitted hardly makes sense; in the sentence κέρδει δέ τί μάλα<sup>93</sup> τοῦτο κερδαλέον τελέθει, the dative κέρδει, apparently there simply to lend emphasis to κερδαλέον, would be most unusual. The most attractive attempt at emendation is Huschke's<sup>94</sup> substitution for κέρδει of κερδοῖ, a Sicilian word for 'vixen'. But κέρδει, because of the presence of κερδαλέον, may have displaced some altogether different word; the best editorial procedure would be to mention Huschke's conjecture, but to place a crux against κέρδει in the text. Anyway, the general sense is clear; the poet is asking what profit comes to slanderers through their deceptions.

'For though another equipage is suffering grievously at sea, I escape sinking, like a cork above the surface of the deep' (79 f.)<sup>95</sup> We must be careful not to assume that the use of the first person singular here means that the poet must be speaking of himself. It can hardly be denied that in Pindar 'I' is very often equivalent to τις,<sup>96</sup> and it would be most unsafe to take it for granted that he means himself rather than the honest victim of slanderers in general.

<sup>92</sup> Wilamowitz took this view at *SB Berlin* 1901, 1313 f., but retracted it at *Pindaros*, 1922, 291. See the excellent statement of it by Schadewaldt *op. cit.* (in n. 1), 331 = 73. So also Farnell, III 128 f., and E. des Places, *Le pronom chez Pindare*, 1947, 72.

<sup>92a</sup> See Köhnken *Hermes* 98, 1970, 1 f.

<sup>92b</sup> With Tycho Mommsen I would put the comma after αἰεί.

<sup>93</sup> The word order suggests that the μάλα is part of the interrogation; cf. *πώμαλα*.

<sup>94</sup> I. G. Huschke, in August Matthiae's *Miscellanea Philologica*, I, 1803, 30. Huschke was a pupil of

Heyne at Göttingen, and later professor at Rostock; see Bursian, *Geschichte der classischen Philologie in Deutschland*, 1883, 641 f.; cf. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien*, 1922, 119 f. Boeckh (II ii 250) calls him 'vir elegantissimus et acutissimus'.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. *Dithyramb* 1.16 (*fr.* 70 a Snell) *φυρόντα νν καὶ μέλαν ἔρκος ἄλμας*: not that this makes it quite certain that ἄλμας goes with ἔρκος and not with ἀβάππιστος.

<sup>96</sup> See David C. Young, *Three Odes* (*op. cit.* in n. 39), 58 f. and Köhnken, *Der Mythos* (*op. cit.* in n. 23), 209 f.



'It is impossible', the poet continues (81 f.), 'for a crafty citizen to utter a word of power among noble men; none the less, throughout his life<sup>97</sup> he greatly flatters all. I have no part in his impudence; may it be mine to show friendship for a friend, and against an enemy I, as an enemy,<sup>98</sup> will run in like a wolf, treading differently at different times in winding paths.'<sup>99</sup> Again we must be careful not to take it for granted that the first person is autobiographical; more probably 'I' stands simply for the *εὐθύγλωσσος*, the honest, plain-spoken man who is contrasted with the cunning slanderers. That is fully confirmed by what follows (86 f.). 'Under every rule the straight speaker excels, when there is one master, when the noisy crowd and when the wise<sup>99a</sup> guard the city.'

Now follows a difficult transition. 'We must not quarrel with the god, who now upholds the power of one party, now gives great might to others. But not even this contents the mind of the envious, but they stake their claims according to an excessive measure and driving that stake<sup>100</sup> into their own hearts inflict a grievous wound, before they have attained what they are striving for. It is best to accept and bear lightly the yoke upon one's neck; but kicking against the goad makes one's path slippery. May I give pleasure to noble men in my dealings with them!'

Men should not resist the god, Pindar is saying, as Greek moralists so often say; they should not struggle against the laws of human life which the gods impose. They should know that human prosperity, at the best, does not last for long, so that the envious hatred of one human being against another is inevitably futile. But this knowledge does not content envious humans; measuring their claims by a standard that demands too much, they cause grief to themselves, not being content with the knowledge that the prosperity of others which angers them will not be permanent. It is best to accept the conditions laid down by the gods for human life; it is best not to kick against the pricks.

At the end the poet prays that he may give pleasure to noble<sup>101</sup> men. That may be taken as a general statement, implying that it is a duty to give praise where praise is due. But in this context it has the further function of expressing the poet's eagerness to give praise to Hieron, and to combat those envious persons who might deny him the glory that is his due.

The whole concluding passage of this poem, it seems to me, is fully understandable if we suppose that Pindar is dilating on a common theme of encomiastic poetry, that of the duty of men, and particularly poets, to give great men proper credit for their benefits to others and to abstain from envy. This accords with the significance of the myth of Ixion, which as the poet clearly tells us is introduced as an example of the dangers of ingratitude. In saying this, I am not attempting to reduce the content of the poem to a series of dry and barren formulas. On the contrary, I believe that the best reward of an increased understanding of the conventions of encomiastic lyric and Pindar's way of handling its standard themes will lie in the insight we attain into the poet's manner of adapting a given *locus communis* to the requirements of a particular situation.

<sup>97</sup> *ἄγαν* offends against sense and respension, and no emendation is convincing. Boeckh's *ἀγάν*, 'bend', is in the words of Burton (*op. cit.* in n. 80) 'not very convincing of the movements of a fawning spaniel'; Heyne's *ἄταν* may derive some colour from the use of *ἀντιδιαπλέκει* at Aeschines 3.28 but gives the verb a most unusual object. J. G. Griffith ap. Burton (*loc. cit.* n. 3) suggests *ἄμαρ*: but then *πάγχι* would stand oddly between this object and its verb.

<sup>98</sup> In early Greece it was part of standard morality to do good to one's friends and evil to one's enemies; see my book *The Justice of Zeus*, 1971, p. 40.

<sup>99</sup> Schadewaldt, *op. cit.* (n. 28), 68 = 326 wished to emend *πατέων* to *πατέωνθ'*: against, see H. Fränkel in his review (quoted in n. 34), 359.

<sup>99a</sup> See above, p. 112.

<sup>100</sup> This translation is designed to bring out Pindar's play on the similarity of *ἐλκόμενοι* and *ἔλκος*. I agree with Gildersleeve and Farnell (both *ad loc.*) and with A. C. Pearson, *Cl. Quart.* 18, 1924, 156-7, in accepting the view stated in the scholia that *στάθμας* means not a balance but a measuring-line, and that *ἐλκόμενοι* means 'drawing out for oneself'. The envious persons have just been mentioned, and it is easy to supply them as subject, so that it is wrong to change *τινος* to *τινες*. Pindar may well speak of 'an excessive kind of measuring-line'.

<sup>101</sup> The prayer at the end of *Ol. 1* is obviously similar.

The frequency in Pindar's poetry of the theme of envy and ingratitude<sup>102</sup> is to be accounted for by the requirements of the religion in which he and his audiences believed. For the believers in that religion, to praise a mortal man is a difficult and even a dangerous action. Real felicity belongs only to the gods; mortal men, even those favoured by the gods, are granted only certain moments of true happiness; these quickly pass, and will be followed by misfortune, and in the end death is inevitable. That makes it highly desirable for the favoured mortal to ensure that his brief hours of happiness and glory attain a kind of immortality; this can only be achieved through the action of a poet, who through the gifts of Zeus' son Apollo and his daughters the Muses can preserve human achievements from oblivion. In praising the victor, the poet must abstain from any utterance that might seem to infringe the privileges reserved for the gods; that might bring down upon his patron that 'divine envy' which guards Dike, the order of the universe, against the encroachments of mortals who try to rise above their proper sphere. It is not only the envy of the gods that mortals must beware of; they are inevitably menaced by the envy of their fellow-mortals. Envy is the force against which the poet who would praise his patron has to struggle, and in order to assure his patron's fame the poet must do battle against his detractors; this battle is a common theme of Pindar's poetry, and the mention of it serves to guard against the greater danger of divine envy of his patrons' greatness. Unstintingly, without envy, the poet must give glorious deeds their due; in doing so, he must struggle against the envy of true greatness shown by the common run of men.<sup>102a</sup>

Pindar's lyric poetry, like the tragedy of the great tragedians and like all great poetry, is concerned far less with the accidental particulars than with the permanent conditions of human life. Yet the theme of envy seems to be touched on with special frequency and special gravity when the patron who is being celebrated is rendered by his wealth and power specially prone to the attacks of envy. We know that Hieron, like Theron and Arcesilas of Cyrene, had in fact many powerful enemies, who before long were to bring down the dynasty; and this fact can hardly be quite irrelevant to the emphasis upon this theme in the poems which Pindar addressed to him. But to understand Pindar's treatment of that theme, we must understand the religion which supplied his poetry with its background.

Since the time of the ancient commentators it has been generally believed that the concluding passage of the Second Pythian alludes to happenings at the court of Hieron.<sup>103</sup> Some modern scholars, it is true, have questioned the statement, found in the scholia and believed by many moderns, that Pindar is defending himself against his poetical rivals, Simonides and Bacchylides.<sup>103a</sup> They have pointed out that nothing in the text compels us to suppose that these poets are in Pindar's mind; and that the ancient scholars may have imagined it simply because they knew that Bacchylides celebrated Hieron's victory in the Olympic chariot race of 468, and did not know Pindar to have done the same.<sup>104</sup> The nearest approach to any positive evidence in favour of the theory comes from the Second Olympian Ode, where Pindar seems to say that *two* noisy crows shriek against Zeus' eagle;

<sup>102</sup> See Bowra, *Pindar* 186-7; Thummer, *op. cit.* (in n. 40), I 80-1; Köhnken, *op. cit.* (in n. 23), Index s.v. 'Neid'. I have not seen W. Steinlein, *φθόνος und verwandte Begriffe in der älteren griechischen Literatur*, Diss. Erlangen, 1944 (cited by Thummer, *loc. cit.*, p. 80, n. 56). S. Eitrem, 'The Pindaric Phthonos', *Studies presented to D. M. Robinson*, II, 1953, 531 f., has some useful references.

<sup>102a</sup> That envy is not to be avoided by those who aim at greatness: *κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος* (*Pyth.* 1.85; cf. Aeschylus, *Agam.* 939 *ὁ δ' ἀφθόνητος οὐκ ἐπιζήλος πέλει*). The scene of the tapestries in the *Agamemnon* well brings out the Greek religious attitude

to *φθόνος*. The great man is bound to provoke the *φθόνος* of men; that does not matter, provided he does nothing to provoke that of the gods. Steinlein (*op. cit.* in n. 72), according to Thummer, *loc. cit.*, 'vom Neid als etwas Erwünschtem spricht', while E. Milobenski, *Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie*, 1964, argues that that view of it is not consistent with Pindar's. But Pindar, like Aeschylus, thought that *φθόνος* was both to be desired and to be avoided.

<sup>103</sup> Bowra, *Pindar*, 1964, 135, believes this.

<sup>103a</sup> See, for example, Mary R. Lefkowitz, *HSCP* 73, 1968, p. 55, n. 13.

<sup>104</sup> See, e.g., Burton, *op. cit.* (in n. 80), 126 f.

but the lightest possible alteration converts the dual to a plural imperative,<sup>105</sup> so that the number two vanishes. But though not all modern scholars believe in the allusion to the Cean poets, almost all suppose that Pindar is warning Hieron against believing the slanders which certain enemies have uttered against him. Their writings show how the text can be twisted to yield this implication. But I believe that I have shown that the most natural interpretation, strongly reinforced by the parallels supplied by a consideration of Pindar's treatment of similar themes throughout his works, makes it absolutely unnecessary to have recourse to any speculations of this kind. That Pindar in a poem written to celebrate a chariot victory, or at any rate to praise a patron, should have chosen to tack on at the end a complaint against his own private adversaries seems to me a notion wholly inconsistent with all that we know about encomiastic poetry and its canons, about the nature of patronage, and about the poetic practice of the ancient world.<sup>106</sup> The belief originated in the idle speculations of the ancient scholars; but during the nineteenth century it was fostered by the conjunction of historicism and romanticism. Historicism tried to explain all difficulties in terms of historical allusions, and when history was not known encouraged scholars to invent it; and romanticism took it for granted that the true poet poured out what was in his heart, even when he was executing a commission for a great ruler for which he was to receive a fee.<sup>107</sup>

The dangers of an uncritical application of the new approach can most be illustrated from the recent handling of the difficult problems presented by the Seventh Nemean Ode. This was written at an unknown<sup>108</sup> date to honour Sogenes, son of Thearion, an Aeginetan victor in the boys' pentathlon at the Nemean Games.

<sup>105</sup> Bergk's alteration of γαπέτον to γαπέτων is accepted by Schroeder and Snell, though not by Farnell, Bowra or Turyn; for a doxography of the problem, see J. van Leeuwen, *Pindarus' Tweede Olympische Ode*, 1964, 245 f.

<sup>106</sup> F. Mezger (*Pindars Siegeslieder*, 1880) deserves honourable mention here. On p. 50 he writes, 'Die Erklärung der Ode ist mit ganz besonderen Schwierigkeiten verknüpft, so dass es nicht zu verwundern ist, wenn hier die Ansichten der Ausleger noch mehr als sonst auseinander gehen. Nur darin stimmen sie alle überein, dass sie in dem Gedichte eine Reihe von Warnungen und Ermahnungen erblicken, welche der Dichter mit seinem gewohnten Freimuth an den zum Missbrauch seiner Macht hinneigenden Fürsten richt. Und gerade dies anzunehmen ist sehr bedenklich. Denn es hat sehr wenig Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich, dass sich ein Fürst, noch dazu von dem Stolze Hierons, dazu hergegeben haben sollte, dass ihm ein Dichter an seinem Ehrentage unter grösstem Pompe vor tausenden seiner Untertanen den Text lesen durfte, und dass er ihn dafür noch reichlich bezahlte. Hieron wollte von Pindar Lobgedichte und Siegesgesänge, und Siegesgesänge und Lobgedichte hat Pindar ihm auch gedichtet.' As Young (ap. Calder and Stern, *op. cit.* in n. 28, 26) remarks, 'Mezger often made remarkably perceptive and unique observations about what was happening in the poems'. But when he gets to the detailed interpretation of the final section, Mezger is led by the 'ungewöhnliche Gemuterregung' of 11.79-85 to conclude that Pindar is defending himself against his enemies.

Bundy, *SP I* 4, n. 15 has written, 'I believe that

this ode, on which I am preparing a monograph, contains nothing personal to Pindar'. I agree, and hope that this article will provide a statement that will do duty at least until Bundy's monograph appears. Every serious student of Pindar looks forward with keen expectancy to the resumption of Bundy's extremely valuable Pindaric studies.

<sup>107</sup> In correcting this tendency, we must resist the temptation to react too far in the opposite direction. Thus when Pindar writes in a poem for the Alcmaeonid Megacles, who was ostracised in 487/6 and won his Pythian victory in 486, that he feels sorry that the victor's great deeds have been requited with envy (*Pyth.* 7, 18 f.), it would be stupid not to acknowledge that the use made of the theme of envy had no relation to the actual fact. Thummer, *op. cit.* in n.40, p. 72, n. 48, after drawing attention to the facts, writes, 'Wir halten es deshalb für methodisch richtig, auch hier, wo eine konkrete historische Situation, auf die sich die Stelle beziehen konnte, vorhanden ist, die Aussage des Dichters aus der Topik, in die sie hineingehört, zu deuten und lediglich mit der Möglichkeit eines konkreten Bezuges zu rechnen'. That seems to me over-cautious.

<sup>108</sup> The dates given in the scholia (κδ' = 547 and υδ' = 527) are impossible, and no certain emendation has been offered. Wilamowitz and other scholars argue for a date about 485; others, less numerous, follow Hermann in putting the poem in about 467. See E. Tugendhat, *Hermes* 88, 1960, 385, n. 1; S. Fogelmark, *op. cit.* in n. 115, notes 30 and 31. Fogelmark argues for a later date. I share his scepticism about the arguments for a later date

The ancient commentary on this poem tells us that Aristarchus and his pupil Aristodemus believed that in it Pindar tried to excuse himself for an uncomplimentary reference to Neoptolemus made in a Paean he had written earlier.<sup>109</sup>

That statement was not taken seriously by all nineteenth century scholars.<sup>110</sup> But when in 1908 Grenfell and Hunt published large fragments of the Paean in question, its truth seemed to have been confirmed. Wilamowitz in an article written immediately after the publication of the Paean and again in his *Pindaros* of 1922<sup>111</sup> held that Pindar in the Seventh Nemean was defending the account of the end of Neoptolemus which he had given in the Paean; Schadewaldt<sup>112</sup> in 1928 agreed with him.

In 1960 the relation between the Paean and the Seventh Nemean was re-examined in a careful and judicious article by Ernst Tugendhat.<sup>113</sup> Tugendhat showed that the differences between the narration about Neoptolemus in the paean and that in the epinikion are not such as to prove that Pindar is defending his earlier treatment of the story. Rather, he is asserting that he in his poetry speaks the truth; this is something he does in many of his poems, but here he does it with special emphasis, and accompanies his assertion with a fresh treatment of the story of Neoptolemus, designed to win approval in Aegina. Tugendhat holds that only one short passage (ll.102-4) contains an unambiguous reference to the earlier treatment of the Neoptolemus story and the trouble it had caused. He shows with great skill how the handling of the matter of Neoptolemus is combined with the praise of the victor, both in relation to the pervading theme of human destiny, which ordains for all men a mixture of good and bad fortune, and that of poetry, which can perpetuate the good.

Here, if anywhere, we seemed to have a certain example of a personal and historical allusion by the poet. That view was challenged by Bundy in the first of his two papers of 1962. 'N.7, a straightforward enkomion', he wrote, 'has been canonised as the poet's personal apology for offensive references to Neoptolemus in the ode we now possess fragmentarily as Pa.6';<sup>114</sup> the authors of the scholia, he adds, had only the odes to aid them. Bundy's opinion has been justified in more detail by Erich Thummer in four pages of the introduction of his commentary on the Isthmian Odes of 1968; by W. J. Slater in an article of 1969; and now at greater length by Adolf Köhnken, in the useful book, published in 1971, in which he has examined the function of the myth in six of Pindar's epinicians. The received opinion has been defended by G. F. Gianotti, by C. P. Segal and by S. Fogelmark.<sup>115</sup>

The best way of surveying this controversy will be by examining the Seventh Nemean, section by section, not giving a detailed commentary, but concentrating upon matters relevant to the central problem. Like several Pindaric odes, this one opens with the invocation of a divinity; usually it is not one of the great gods, but a minor deity or a

advanced by W. Theiler, 'Die zwei Zeitstufen in Pindars Stil und Vers' (*Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse*, 17.4, 1941, 255 f. = *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur*, 1971, 148 f.). But I find his own arguments (derived from the incidence of colour words and from the nature of references to Zeus and Apollo) still less convincing than I find Theiler's. A style like Pindar's offers uncommonly few reliable indications of date, and few of the many attempts to date poems whose dates have not been preserved by means of the Olympian and Pythian victor lists can command great confidence. Any serious attack upon the problem would have to take into account far more factors than even Theiler, let alone Fogelmark, has considered.

<sup>109</sup> See  $\Sigma$  on 70 (*Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina*, ed. A. B. Drachmann, iii, p. 126 (on Aristarchus);  $\Sigma$  on 94a (ib., p. 129.4);  $\Sigma$  on 123a (ib., p. 134. 6 f.);  $\Sigma$

on 150a (ib., p. 137.3). See H. Fränkel, *Hermes* 89, 1961, 387 f.

<sup>110</sup> See Tugendhat, *op. cit.* in n. 108, 386, n. 1; Hermann, for instance, thought this explanation was an invention of the ancient commentators.

<sup>111</sup> *SB Berlin, ph.-hist. kl.*, 1908, 328 f. = Calder and Stern, *op. cit.* (in n. 28), 127 f.; *Pindaros*, 159 f.

<sup>112</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 28.

<sup>113</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 108.

<sup>114</sup> *SP I*, p. 4; cf. 29, n. 70; and see J. Fontenrose, 'The Cult and Myth of Pyrrhos at Delphi' (*University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology* 4, no. 3, 1960, p. 223, n. 14).

<sup>115</sup> Thummer, *op. cit.* in n. 40, I 94 f.; Slater, *op. cit.* in n. 41, 91 f.; Köhnken, *op. cit.*, in n. 23, 37 f.; G. F. Gianotti, *RFIC* 94, 1966, 385 f.; Ellen Wüst, *Pindar als geschichtschreibender Dichter*, Diss. Tübingen, 1967; C. P. Segal, *TAPA* 98, 1967, 431 f. (with bibliography); S. Fogelmark, *Studies in Pindar, with particular reference to Paean VI and Nemean VII*, 1972.

personified abstraction which is specially relevant to the present moment. Here it is Eleithyia, goddess of childbirth.

'Eleithyia, who sits beside the deep-thinking Fates, child of mighty Hera, hear me, bringer to birth of children. Without you we cannot look upon the light nor upon black night to get our share in your sister, Hebe of the lovely limbs. We do not all draw breath for lives that are alike; yoked as we are by destiny, we are constrained by different fates. With your aid Thearion's son also was singled out for excellence, and the glory of Sogenes is sung of among the men of the pentathlon' (1-8).

The ancient commentators inquired why Eleithyia was invoked here. The five different reasons they offer are discussed by Hermann Fränkel in an article of 1961.<sup>116</sup> He singles out as correct the fourth of these: that Pindar always praises those whose excellence is inborn or natural rather than those whose excellence is due to learning, and Eleithyia has equipped Sogenes to become a great athlete from his birth. This may be part of the truth, but it is not the most important part. First, the first of the explanations in the scholia is worth noting. This is that Pindar is playing on the victor's name.<sup>117</sup> Sogenes is compounded from the root *σω-*, meaning 'save' or 'preserve', and the root *γεν-* meaning 'family' or 'birth'; Eleithyia is called *γενέτειρα τέκνων*, which in this context must mean 'bringer to birth of children'. The ancient commentator thinks this a frigid pun; but Pindar, like other early poets, attributed a mystic significance to names. When in a passage quoted in the following scholion he plays on the derivation of the name of his patron Hieron from the word for 'holy', he is not being merely frivolous. The play on names serves to introduce the goddess, but it by no means exhausts the significance of her choice. She was from early times connected with Hera, goddess of marriage and mother of Hebe, goddess of youth and youthful vigour; she was from early times linked with the Fates, who spin out the destiny of men given them at their birth. The mention of these connections, and of the special functions of the goddess, normal in the invocation of a divinity, lead Pindar straight to what is a frequent topic in his poetry, the varied destinies of men; this is to be a central theme of the present ode, serving to link its parts together. Then follows the first mention of the victor and his triumph, and from here, at the beginning of the antistrophe (9 f.), the poet moves to the praise of the victor's native island.

'For he lives in the song-loving city of the men of Aegina with their clashing spears; they are most eager to nurse a spirit that strives in contest.' 'Song-loving' as an epithet of Aegina takes Pindar straight to a central theme of all his poetry, that of the unique power of poetry to preserve the memory of great deeds. 'And if a man triumphs in action, he gives honey-sweet occasion to the streams of the Muses. For mighty deeds of valour lie in darkness if they lack songs; and in one way only we know of a mirror for noble actions, if by means of Memory with her bright veil they find a reward for labour in verses whose singing brings fame.'

<sup>116</sup> *Op. cit.* in n. 109, 391 f.

<sup>117</sup> See Σ on I a quoted on p. 116 of Drachmann's third volume, 1.19: *ἔνιοι δέ φασι πρὸς τοῦνομα τοῦ Σωγένου παρεϊκύνθαι τὴν Εἰλειθυίαν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν σωγενῆ τινα διὰ τὸ τὰ γεννώμενα ἀνασώζειν τὸν οὖν Πίνδαρον ψυχρευσάμενον πρὸς τοῦνομα τῆς Εἰλειθυίας μεμνήσθαι.* Paul Maas drew Schadewaldt's attention to the possibility that Eleithyia might have been recalled to Pindar by the victor's name (Schadewaldt, *loc. cit.*, 297 = 39, n. 2. He does not quote the scholion. G. Coppola, *Introduzione a Pindaro*, p. 51, who also takes this view, does quote it. The next scholion rejects the idea on the ground that Pindar plays on names only when an actual homonymy exists, as at *fr.* 105.2 (*ζαθέων ἱερῶν ὁμώνυμε*) or *fr.* 120.1,

where Pindar alludes to the homonymy of Alexander of Macedon and Alexander or Paris, son of Priam. The argument is not a good one; note the opening of Bacchylides 6: *Λάχων Αἰὸς μεγίστου λάχε φέρτατον πόδεσσι | κῦδος . . .* Some doubt attaches to the etymologies of Amenas from *αἰεὶ μενεῖν* at *Pyth.* 1.67 (*cf.* 1.64) and of the Kronion from *χρόνος* at *Ol.* 10.49 f. with which Pindar is credited by J. H. Quincey, *Rh. Mus.* 106, 1963, 144-5 and 146 (in support of the second, Quincey might have quoted Pherecydes of Syros; see M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 10). For other etymologies in early poetry, see Pfeiffer, *SB Munich* 1938, p. 9, n. 2 and E. Fraenkel on Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 682.

Now follow words that have been misunderstood even in recent times.<sup>118</sup> 'Wise men know when the third wind is coming, and avarice does not distort their judgment. Rich and poor alike come to death's mark.' The third wind is the wind that will stir up the third and most formidable of three successive waves; the same notion is in Plato's mind when in a famous passage of his *Republic*<sup>119</sup> he compares the problems presented to Socrates by the formidable task of justifying the communistic elements in his ideal state to three successive waves, the last being the greatest, which he must stand up to. 'Wise men' in Pindar often means 'poets', but the wise men here are clearly not poets; they are men who have done noble deeds, and are not prevented by avarice from spending money to ensure that the memory of these deeds will live in poetry.

Next Pindar proceeds to the most famous instance of fame conferred by poetry. 'I believe that the fame of Odysseus is more than what he suffered because of the sweet words of Homer; for upon his falsehoods and his winged art there lies a majesty; and skill beguiles us, deceiving us with tales.' In this passage there is one word missing; and it would be possible to restore it in such a way that the falsehoods upon which there lies a majesty were those told by Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, and not those of Homer. But the context shows clearly that this is wrong.<sup>120</sup> The Muses told Hesiod (*Theog.* 27) that they could tell lies resembling the truth, and also tell the truth when they pleased. Pindar claims very strongly that he in his poetry tells the truth; but he does not claim that all poets do so; and the point here is that poetry can confer fame even on those who do not deserve it.

The thought of the deceptive power of words and the fallibility of human judgment gives the transition to the praise of Ajax. In all the poems Pindar wrote for Aeginetans, he praises Aeacus, son of Zeus and Aegina and his descendants, his sons Peleus and Telamon, his grandsons, Achilles and Ajax, and his great-grandson Neoptolemus; in this ode, Ajax and Neoptolemus are praised.<sup>121</sup> 'The heart of most men is blind; for if it could have seen the truth, mighty Ajax would not, in anger over the arms, have driven his smooth sword through his heart—Ajax, who after Achilles was strongest of those whom the escort of Zephyrus' breath sped in the swift ships straight to Ilus' city to bring back his wife to fair-haired Menelaus.' In similar fashion Pindar in the Eighth Nemean (24 f.) mentions the fate of Ajax as an instance of the power of envy, passing next to what is for him the kindred topic of deceit.

But in the Seventh Nemean the praise of Ajax is a kind of parenthesis; it does not divert the poet from the motive of fame as a bulwark against oblivion. 'But the wave of Hades comes upon us all, and falls upon the obscure and on the famous; and honour belongs to those whose tender fame the god makes grow when they are dead.'

The expression 'the wave of Hades' seems to take up the metaphor of 'the third wind'. Just as rich and poor alike perish, so do the famous and the unknown; the emendation in

<sup>118</sup> E.g., by Thummer, *op. cit.* (in n. 40), I 97, n. 77. The right explanation was given by G. Fraccaroli, *Le ode di Pindaro*, 1894, 586; O. Schroeder, *Sokrates*, I, 1913, 532 (cf. his Appendix of 1923, 522); by A. Puech in his Budé text of Pindar; by H. Fränkel in his review of Schadewaldt, cited in n. 34; by G. Méautis, *Pindare le Dorien*, 1962, 51; by Carlo Pavese, *Quaderni Urbinati* 2, 1966, 109 f.; by G. F. Gianotti, *op. cit.* (in n. 115), 388 f.; by Tugendhat, *op. cit.*, 401, n. 5; by A. Setti, *Studia Florentina A. Ronconi sexagenario oblata*, 1969, 410-1; by Köhnken, *op. cit.*, 44 with n. 41. There is no excuse whatever for anyone who gets it wrong; p. 468 of Slater's *Lexicon to Pindar* (1969) contain several instances of σοφός and σοφία in a general sense.

<sup>119</sup> 472 A. τριταῖον ἀνεμὸν here must mean 'the

third wind', not 'the third day's wind'. For this sense of the adjective, see Barrett on Euripides, *Hipp.* 275; the context shows that this is the sense here.

<sup>120</sup> In l. 22 a syllable is missing; most editions refer οἱ to Homer (see E. des Places, *op. cit.* in n. 92, 1947, 31; and follow Hermann in reading ψεύδεσσι οἱ ποταναῖ <τε> μαχανᾶν. Köhnken has argued for Erasmus Schmid's <γε> in preference to <τε> since he thinks the lies should be those of Odysseus and not those of Homer.

<sup>121</sup> Thummer's belief that Pindar in this poem has to praise Neoptolemus with special emphasis because he is only a minor hero (*op. cit.*, I 94) shows a total failure to understand what the Aiakidai mean for Pindar that I find amazing.

Snell's text which would substitute for 'the obscure and the famous' 'him who does not and him who does expect it' has nothing to be said for it.<sup>122</sup> Honour belongs to those whose fame the god increases; the supernatural agent is the god, without whose aid the human agent, the poet, could do nothing.

Now comes what seems a sudden transition to the second hero descended from Aeacus who is praised in the poem, Neoptolemus, son of Achilles. At the beginning the text is uncertain; I give a literal rendering of what is printed in Snell's edition: 'It was to bring help that he came to the mighty navel of broad-breasted earth—and Neoptolemus lies in the land of Pytho—after he had sacked Priam's city, over which the Greeks had laboured. And when he sailed away he missed Skyros, but came to Ephyra. And he ruled briefly in Molossia; but the race ever honours him for that royalty.<sup>122a</sup> And he left to visit the god, bringing treasures from the first-fruits of Troy; and there as he came against him in a battle over meat a man thrust at him with a knife. And his Delphian hosts were deeply grieved. But he paid a debt to fate; for it was ordained that for the future there should be one of the Aeacids in the ancient grove, by the god's house with its fine wall, and that he should live there to see justice done at the processions for heroes with their many sacrifices.'

At this point we must consider what is said about Neoptolemus in what we have of the Sixth Paean. The passage about him (98 f.) forms part of a long section in praise of Apollo. Apollo, the poet says, postponed the fall of Troy by killing Achilles; Apollo pitted his strength against Hera and Athena. But even Apollo could not save Troy, since not even Zeus overrules the decrees of Fate; the Achaeans sent for Achilles' young son, Neoptolemus, and he took the city. 'But he never again saw his kind mother, nor the horses of the Myrmidons in his father's fields, as he urged on the bronze-helmed throng. He came to the Molossian land near Tomaros, and did not escape the winds, nor the far-darter with the broad quiver. For the god had sworn that because he had slain the aged Priam after he had leapt upon the altar at the hearth, he should not come to his loving home, nor to old age; and he slew him as he fought with the attendants over the honours due to him in the precinct the god loves beside earth's broad navel.'

Is Tugendhat (391) right in saying that this is not a modification of what is said in the Paean, but a significantly different story? Let us compare the two. In the Paean, Neoptolemus offends Apollo by the atrocious act of killing the aged Priam while he was a suppliant at the altar of Zeus which stood in the courtyard of the palace. In both stories, Neoptolemus sails away meaning to reach Thessaly and is diverted to Molossia, only in the Paean the god causes the winds to drive him off his course. In both accounts, Neoptolemus perishes in a brawl with the Delphians over the division of sacrificial meats. Only it is significant that in the Paean Apollo himself is the killer,<sup>123</sup> in the Epinikion a man; Pindar strongly hints at the story, recorded as early as Pherecydes in the fifth century, that this was the Delphian hero Machaireus, son of Daitas. The Paean says nothing about Neoptolemus' reason for coming to Delphi, but the scholia mention several reasons given by others. One was that he planned to plunder the temple, another that he came to demand that the god pay him an indemnity for having killed his father. The epinikion says that he came to bring the god an offering from the Trojan booty. It claims that the Delphians were deeply

<sup>122</sup> The point is well dealt with by Köhnken, p. 66 (with nn. 141-2). For meaning 'to be celebrated', cf. Sophocles, *O. T.* 1191-2.

<sup>122a</sup> The word order indicates that *oi* is attributive, not ethic-possessive; see Des Places, *op. cit.* in n. 92, 31-2.

<sup>123</sup> At *Paean* 6.119 we must read *κράδεν*: see S. L. Radt, *Pindars Zweiter und sechster Paian*, 1958, 169. J. Fontenrose (*op. cit.* in n. 114, p. 223, n. 14), sum-

marising Bundy's unpublished views, says that this passage does not show that Apollo killed Neoptolemus 'directly', because the Seventh Nemean 'shows that for Apollo a temple attendant was the killer'. But even if we grant the highly questionable proposition that Pindar always believed in a single version of a mythical event and stuck to it throughout his works, it is perfectly clear that in the Paean Pindar made Apollo responsible for the hero's death.

distressed about the incident, which is certainly not the impression one derives from the account given by Euripides in his *Andromache*. It explains that it had to happen, so that one of the Aeacids could remain permanently near the temple to supervise religious processions. Unlike the Paean, the epinikion alludes to the claim of the fifth-century kings of Molossia to be descended from Neoptolemus.

To sum up, there is only one difference of hard fact, but that is in the all-important matter of who killed Neoptolemus. The story in the Paean is what we would expect in a poem written in honour of Apollo for a Delphic ceremony; the story in the epinikion is exactly what we might expect the same poet to make of the same tradition in a poem written in honour of an Aeginetan and for performance in Aegina. The second story is wholly consonant with the theory that it was introduced in order to remove offence caused by the first. But so far we have found nothing in the poem that obliges us to believe this; and we shall have to go further with our examination of the ode before we can decide the question.

At the beginning of the section I have just translated, there is a difficult problem of textual criticism and interpretation. I have accepted the emendation which makes the poet say that someone came to Delphi bringing help.<sup>124</sup> Who was that person? Presumably Neoptolemus; but if so, there are two difficulties. First, the introduction of Neoptolemus is strangely abrupt: 'it was to bring help that he came—and Neoptolemus lies in Delphi—after he had taken Troy'. Tugendhat argues that we are not made to wait long for elucidation; but I find the sudden transition to Neoptolemus somewhat disconcerting. Secondly, in what sense did Neoptolemus come to Delphi 'bringing help'? To bring offerings to the god is very oddly described as 'bringing help'; the phrase would be appropriate only if Delphi had been on the point of going bankrupt. Thirdly, Snell's text involves taking the words *ἐν Πυθικοῖσι . . . κεῖται* as a parenthesis, which though not impossible is somewhat awkward.

The scholia contain the reading *ἔμολον*, which suggested to Hermann the reading *μόλον*. Suppose that *βοαθοῶν* is right; then the words will mean, 'It was to bring help that I came to Delphi', and they will refer to Pindar.<sup>124a</sup> To bring help to whom? The preceding sentence is 'Honour belongs to those whose tender fame the god increases when they are dead'. The god does so by causing poets to sing their praises; and it happens that Pindar more than once uses such terms as 'come to the help of' to describe his relation to the patrons whose great deeds he protects against oblivion. In the Thirteenth Olympian (96 f.) he says, 'I have gladly come as an ally to the Muses on their glorious thrones and to the Oligaitidai (his patron's family); the word *ἐπίκουρος* meaning 'ally', is also the epithet of the road of words which in the First Olympian (110) he claims to have discovered. In the Ninth Olympian (83) he has come in friendship and goodness to aid the Isthmian garlands of Lampromachos; and in the very Sixth Paean (10–11) which has been thought relevant to our poem he has come to Delphi to protect the citizens and his own honour against the reproach of inability to act.

This interpretation was put forward in 1967 by Ellen Wüst and C. P. Segal. It makes the punctuation distinctly smoother; but if we follow them in taking *ἐπεὶ* as temporal, as others have always taken it, *κεῖται* will go ill in the apodosis to a temporal clause with aorist verb. Suppose we take *ἐπεὶ* as causal. Then the following words will mean, 'And Neoptolemus lies in the land of Pytho, since he took Troy . . . and on his way back missed Skyros, but came to Ephyra'. After the causal *ἐπεὶ*, we should expect the explanation of how he came to Delphi to follow soon; but the poet launches into an account

<sup>124</sup> Farnell placed a full stop after the words *τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται | ὣν θεὸς ἄβρον αὔξει λόγον τεθνακότων*, and changed *βοαθῶν* to *βοαθοῶν*. Snell reads *βοαθοῶν τοι παρά μέγαν ὀμφαλὸν εὐρυκόλπου μόλεν*

*χθονός—ἐν Πυθίοισι δὲ δαπέδοις κεῖται—Πριάμον πόλιω Νεοπτόλεμος ἐπεὶ πράθεν, . . .*

<sup>124a</sup> Fraccaroli (*op. cit.* in n. 118, p. 588, n. 2) read *μόλον* and took it as referring to Pindar; see his note.



of Neoptolemus' travels, and when he finally comes to explain how he got to Delphi, the *ἐπεὶ* clause has been abandoned.<sup>125</sup>

The causal *ἐπεὶ* introduces not simply the statement that Neoptolemus took Troy, but the whole explanation of how he came to Delphi.

If this interpretation is correct, the problem of whether the ancient commentators were right in thinking Pindar wished to justify himself to the Aeginetans because of the paean is solved, for the occasion on which Pindar came to Delphi to bring help to Neoptolemus in the sense of helping to preserve his fame can refer only to the occasion of the paean's performance.<sup>126</sup> But even without this argument I believe that the necessity of supposing there to be a reference to the paean can be established.

Now follows a difficult passage, taken by Wilamowitz and Schadewaldt to be part of Pindar's self-defence. 'For justice, whose name is beautiful, three words will be enough. The witness is not false, Aegina, who stands over your achievements and those of the descendants of Zeus. I make bold to say it, moving along a road of words that is my own, with power in respect of shining deeds of glory.' My rendering of the last sentence needs a good deal of justification.

When Pindar says, 'For justice . . . , three words will be enough', there is no use in trying to work out what the three words are; in Greek 'three', like our expression 'two or three', can simply mean 'a few'. People who have believed that the Seventh Nemean cannot be explained without reference to the Sixth Paean have assumed that when Pindar says that three words will be enough for justice, he must mean that three words will be enough to justify him against the charges resulting from the Paean. In the lines that follow, Pindar undoubtedly has his own art in mind. That becomes clear once we raise the question of who is the witness to the achievements of Aegina mentioned in the next sentence. Is the witness Apollo, or is it Neoptolemus, or is it Pindar? The presence of Neoptolemus at Delphi does not make it easier for Apollo, or for Neoptolemus himself, to bear witness to the achievements of the Aeginetans. But Pindar does bear witness to their achievements; and in several passages he speaks of his relation to those he praises in these terms or others very like them. At the beginning of the Fourth Olympian, the Seasons have sent him to be witness of supreme achievements, by which he means those of the victors in the Olympic Games; in the Second Partheneion (38 f.), the leader of the chorus claims to be a faithful witness of the good deeds of Agasikles. In the Fourth Isthmian (28), 'testimonies of the measureless glory of men dead or alive' must refer to poetry; and in the Sixth Olympian (20), Pindar declares that he will bear witness upon oath to the admirable qualities of Agesias.

The witness is surely Pindar;<sup>127</sup> and when Pindar claims that three words will be enough for justice, he is vindicating his own poetic honour.

Before going back to 1.48, let us consider the difficult sentence beginning in 1.50. *θρασύ μοι τόδ' ἐῖπεῖν* must, I think, mean, 'I make bold to say this'. I do not think that the 'road of words' can be the predicate of the indirect statement; the pronoun 'this' would then be obscure. Can the words mean, 'I make bold to say this, that I have at home a road of words . . .'? The absence of the infinitive of the verb to be seems to me to make against this view. I have underlined the possibility that the words *ὄδον λόγων* are an internal accusative depending on the verb *ἐῖπεῖν*, so that the sense is, 'I make bold to say

<sup>125</sup> 'Die Griechen gebrauchen *ἐπεὶ* sehr häufig auch da, wo der grundangebende Satz nicht einen untergeordneten Teil des Hauptsatzes bildet, sondern vielmehr die Geltung eines mit *γάρ* beigeordneten Hauptsatzes hat, in welchem Falle im Deutschen durch *denn* übersetzt wird': Kühner-Gerth ii 461. So no one need find it odd that a sentence whose main verb is *κεῖται* is followed by an *ἐπεὶ* clause whose main verb is aorist. Cf. *Ol.* 6.27; at *Ol.* 1.26

the misunderstanding of a causal *ἐπεὶ* as temporal led to ludicrous results (see J. Th. Kakridis, *Hermes* 63, 1928, 475 = Calder and Stern, *op. cit.* (in n. 28), 188 f. = *Μελέτες καὶ ἄρθρα*, 1971, 66 f., for the right interpretation).

<sup>126</sup> It is strange that Thummer (I 96, n. 72) has not seen this, although he too reads *βοηθῶν . . . μόλον*.

<sup>127</sup> See Tugendhat 395, with n. 1.

this (moving along), a road of words . . .'.<sup>128</sup> But I think it likelier that Wilamowitz and Schadewaldt are right in emending *ὄδδν κυρίαν* to *ὄδδς κυρία*.

Whatever the exact syntax, the general sense is clear; in speaking of a 'road of words from home that has power in respect of shining deeds of glory', Pindar is speaking of his own poetic art.

The notion of the road or path of poetry is not rare in Pindar. In the first Olympian (110), he says that he will find a helping road of words to praise Hieron; that is the most relevant of many similar expressions. For the notion of a road of words that is valid in respect of glorious deeds, we may recall the opening words of the parodos of Aeschylus' Agamemnon (104 f.), where the old men who form the chorus declare that they have power to sing of the expedition to Troy because, aged as they are, they still possess the gift of song. *οἴκοθεν* means that Pindar does not depend on others, but relies on his own gift, his own 'fountain of immortal verses' (*Pyth.* IV, end).

In this place Pindar is vindicating his own poetic art. Does it follow that when he says that three words will suffice for justice he means that three words will suffice to do him justice? Immediately before, he has been speaking of Neoptolemus; so that it is only natural for the hearer to suppose that the sense is, 'Three words will suffice to do justice to Neoptolemus'. It is quite natural for Pindar then to go on to emphasise his own truthfulness; three words, spoken by one as truthful as himself, will be sufficient. Pindar has praised Neoptolemus, and if he then goes on to say 'Three words will be enough for justice', it is perfectly possible that he simply means, 'A few words will be enough to do justice to so great a hero'. In that case, there is no need to imagine any reference to the complaint provoked by the Sixth Paean. Taken by themselves, and taken independently of my explanation of the words 'to bring help' in l.33, the words do not prove the existence of such a reference. But if I am right in thinking that at l.33 Pindar has insisted that he came to Delphi on an earlier occasion to bring help to Neoptolemus, meaning that he came to praise him, then I find it hard not to take l.48 as a reference to the complaints, and to suppose that the poet's insistence on his own truthfulness, normal as it is in an epinician ode, has in this place a special appropriateness.

Here Pindar passes from the topic by means of a transitional formula of a common type; one tires of everything, even of honey and of making love. 'But in every action rest is delightful; we grow tired even of honey and of the pleasant flowers of Aphrodite.'

When the poet passes to the familiar statement that different men have different fates, he does so because it will serve him as a foil to the praise of the victor's father that will follow. But the choice as foil of this particular commonplace of gnomic wisdom is specially appropriate in a poem which has begun with the invocation of Eleithyia, who sits beside the Fates, and which has gone on from that beginning to mention the diversity of human fortunes. 'By nature we differ from each other in our lives; one man has one lot, one another; and for one man to win success, gathering up all manner of good fortune, is impossible; I do not know of one to whom Fate has granted in permanence this consummation. But to you, Thearion, she gives a fitting moment of happiness; you have found the courage to do great things, and she has not harmed your judgment'. Though Thearion has found courage to achieve triumph, he has resisted the temptation to commit hybris; he is not one of those whose wits have been taken away by Ate so that he has committed acts of folly.

'I am your friend', the poem continues, 'keeping off dark reproach, as though by bringing streams of water to the man I honour I shall praise true glory; and for the noble this reward is fitting' (61 f.). The ceremonial salutation of the victor as a friend is

<sup>128</sup> Frl. Wüst (*op. cit.* in n. 115, 146) seems to incline to this view. Although I know of no closely similar sentence involving a verb of saying with an expression like *ὄδδν λόγων* as an internal accusative, I do not find the construction impossible. But see

Wilamowitz (*ap. Calder and Stern, op. cit.* in n. 28, p. 138; cf. *Pindaros*, 1922, p. 163, n. 1) and Schadewaldt (*op. cit.* in n. 28, 313 = 55); cf. O. Becker, 'Das Bild des Weges', *Hermes Einzelschrift* 4, 1937, 74 f.

paralleled, for instance, in the Third Nemean (76) and in the Second Isthmian (end). Keeping off reproach is as much part of the poet's task as praising the victor; here the end of the Second Pythian supplies the best parallel.

'When he is near the Achaean who lives above the Ionian Sea shall find no fault with me; I trust in his friendship; and among my fellow-citizens my glance is clear. I do not overstep the mark, but draw out of my path all violence. May future time as it comes on be kind; and men shall learn whether I speak crooked words out of tune.'

Who is the Achaean living above the Ionian Sea? The immediately following reference to Pindar's fellow-citizens, suggests that we have here a polar expression of a familiar type; wanting to say, 'no one at all will blame me', the poet first says that no one living very far away will blame him, and then that no one living very near will do so. The earlier mention of the claim of the fifth-century Molossian kings to be descended from Neoptolemus has encouraged the ancient commentator, and also most modern scholars, to think that by 'the Achaean' Pindar means a Molossian, whose approval would help to vindicate the poet from the suspicion of having maligned his king's ancestor. It would be natural to assume that the words *Ἰονίας ὑπὲρ ἁλός*, in the mouth of a poet writing in Thebes, or in Aegina, referred to the inhabitants of Sicily or Magna Graecia; but since Dissen commentators have cited passages from historians and geographers to show that people living on the coast bordered by a particular sea may be said to live not indeed *beyond*, but *above* the sea in question. The Molossians—like the inhabitants of Pallene—may well have laid stress on their claim to be descended from the Achaeans who took Troy, and it seems a shade likelier that they are meant than that 'Achaean' is being used in the general sense of 'Greek' and that the Greeks of Magna Graecia are the persons referred to.<sup>129</sup> But the deduction that Pindar was the proxenos, in the technical sense, of the Molossians in Thebes is quite unwarranted.<sup>129a</sup> *προξενία* can very well mean 'friendship', as at *Ol.* 9,83 and *Parth.* 2,31 (*cf.* *πρόξενου* at *Isthm.* 4.8 and see Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 420 and Sophocles, *El.* 1451), and that is likely to be the sense here also.

Pindar has come to Delphi to defend Neoptolemos' fame; he is keeping off reproach and is praising a victor who truly deserves praise; no one in the future—and the future is the best judge of truth<sup>130</sup>—will be able to say that he has spoken crooked words. All this could be said without a reference to the Sixth Paean; but if that poem could be shown to have been in his mind, what he says here would take on an added significance.

With an apology for his delay in doing so, Pindar now comes to the praise of the young Sogenes. That section of the poem (71–131) is not relevant to my present purpose. But we must consider ll. 102 f., where following a prayer for Sogenes' prosperity we find the words, 'But my heart will never say that I have savaged Neoptolemus with ruthless words.<sup>131</sup> To repeat the same things three or four times is futility, as when someone idly barks at children "Corinth of Zeus".'

<sup>129</sup> See Σ on 95a (Drachmann, vol. iii, 129); Erasmus Schmid translated 'Ionium *supra* mare habitans'. Heyne differed: 'illum dixit Achivum e Sicilia et Italia, si adesset', and also recognised the polar expression: '*nemo nec in propinquis nec in remotis terris habitantium*: pro his memorat Siculos et Italos'. Dissen (first in Boeckh's edition, II, ii, p. 430, and later in his own) argued that places on mountains near a sea can be said to be 'above' that sea; he quoted Strabo 324, *ὑπέρεται δὲ τούτου μὲν τοῦ κόλπου Κίχυρος ἢ πρότερον Ἐφύρα πόλις Θεσπρωτῶν τοῦ δὲ κατὰ Βουθρωτῶν ἢ Φωινίκη. ἐγγὺς δὲ τῆς Κιχύρου πολέχγιον Βουχέτιον Κασσωπαίων μικρὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς θαλάττης ὄν . . .*: 326 *ἀναμέμικται δὲ τούτοις τὰ Ἰλλυρικὰ ἔθνη τὰ πρὸς τῷ νοτίῳ μέρει τῆς ὄρεινῆς καὶ*

*τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰονίου κόλπου. τῆς γὰρ Ἐπιδάμου καὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας μέχρι τῶν Κεραυνίων ὑπεροικοῦσι Βυλλίονες κτλ.* Cf. Thucydides I, 46. 4 (of Chimerium) *ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κείται . . . Ἐφύρη.* Against these we may consider the many places where *ὑπὲρ* with a word for 'sea' means 'beyond the sea', as at *Od.* 13, 256–7 *πυρρῶν Ἰθάκης γε καὶ ἐν Κρήτηι εὐρείη | τηλοῦ ὑπὲρ πόντου.* The latter is the commoner usage.

<sup>129a</sup> Even Thummer (I 97, n.82) allows a personal allusion here, wrongly.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *Ol.* I, 33; 10, 54; *fr.* 159.

<sup>131</sup> *Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν οὐ ποτε φάσει κέαρ | ἀτρόποισι Νεοπτόλεμον ἔλκυσαι | ἔπει.*

I am concerned not with the obscure but in this context obviously relevant proverb at the end, but with the sentence that precedes it. Slater claims that it means 'My heart will declare that it has not injured Neoptolemos with intractable words'; and he explains that this really means, 'I claim that I have praised Neoptolemos with fitting words'. If anyone supposes that Pindar can really have meant this, let him consider Slater's attempt at translation. It unjustifiably waters down the sense of *ἐλκύσαι*, which as almost everyone since antiquity till now has realised is in this place a metaphor taken from the 'worrying' or 'dragging about' of a body by dogs; the use of the word to mean this is familiar from the *Iliad*.<sup>133</sup> The basic meaning of *ἄτροπος*<sup>134</sup> is 'not to be turned aside', and hence 'ruthless' or 'remorseless'; it is familiar as the name of one of the Fates. *οὐ ποτε* goes with *φάσει*, not with *ἐλκύσαι*. Every translator has seen all this except Slater, who in his violent attempt to fit the text to the Procrustean bed of his dogma has done to Pindar's words just what Pindar is denying that he has done to Neoptolemos.

If we take the words in their natural sense, we must admit that Pindar is denying having attacked Neoptolemos; and we can hardly help accepting the explanation that the Sixth Paean had given offence in Aegina, so that Pindar had to defend it. Tugendhat after a careful and scrupulous discussion concluded that this was the only sentence in the poem that forces us to accept this explanation.<sup>135</sup>

But as he says when we look back over the poem we see other passages in a somewhat different light; otherwise the poet's denial that he has savaged Neoptolemos would come abruptly and almost unintelligibly, in this place. Following Frl. Wüst and Segal, I have argued that at l.33 Pindar claims to have gone to Delphi to bring help to Neoptolemos. In the light of ll.102-4, this surely refers to his having gone there on the occasion of the performance of the Paean. If that is right, it will be natural to take the words about justice and the poet's truthfulness at l.48 f. in the light of this earlier reference. But even if my view of l.33 f. is not accepted, it will not be easy to avoid taking l.48 f. in the light of the poet's denial at 102 f. that he has attacked Neoptolemos. Pindar has skilfully contrived to make amends for the alleged slight to Neoptolemos within the framework of an epinician ode which conforms to the normal pattern and in no way lacks unity.

The Sixth Paean, containing as it does, for whatever reason, the praises of Aegina, must have been known on that island; and it would not be surprising if its presentation of Neoptolemos as a savage killer, true as it was to the standard version of the cyclic epics, angered the Aeginetans. It is true that in early times the violent and savage actions of heroes did nothing to diminish their heroic status, or their right to be venerated.<sup>136</sup> Ajax the son of Oileus, whose rape of Cassandra was a main cause of the storm which scattered the Achaean fleet as it sailed home from Troy, received heroic honours in his native state of Locri;<sup>137</sup> the chequered careers of Oedipus and Eurystheus do not diminish their right to worship after death, according to Sophocles and Euripides. Yet as early as the archaic age we discern the tendency to censor stories about heroes in places where they received worship, just as we discern the tendency to censor stories about gods. In Attic tragedy Theseus

<sup>133</sup> *Op. cit.*, 92 f.

<sup>133</sup> *Il.*22.33 *σὲ μὲν κύνες ἠδ' οἰωνοὶ | ἐλκίσουσ' αἰκῶς*; cf. 17,557-8; just so Heracles says he will throw the head of Lycus to be *κυνῶν ἔλκημα* (Euripides, *Heracles* 568; cf. Herodotus I, 140, Plato, *Rep.* 539 B, Theocritus I,135. Σ on 150 A (Drachmann iii, p. 137, 12) says τὸ δὲ ἐλκύσαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνυβρίσαι. ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν ἐλκόντων τὰ σώματα.

<sup>134</sup> On *ἄτροπος*, see H. Fränkel, *art. cit.* (in n. 109), 385; cf. Tugendhat 404.

<sup>135</sup> Slater's treatment of the passage is criticised by Fogelmark, *op. cit.* (in n. 115), 104 f. In dealing with Slater's complaint that it is odd that Pindar

should defend 'a supposed insult in a Paean commissioned for Delphians in Delphi against protests by Aeginetans', Fogelmark might have mentioned that, since the Paean in question contains a long section in praise of Aegina, it would be very odd indeed if it was not known of in that island.

<sup>136</sup> On the gradual process through which heroes came to be credited with moral qualities, see Angelo Brelich, *Gli eroi greci: un problema storico-religioso*, 1958, especially p. 225 f.

<sup>137</sup> Σ on *Ol.*9, 166. See L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*, 1921, 293 f.

appears as a character of blameless virtue; it is hard to recognise in the pattern constitutional monarch of Euripides' *Suppliants* the betrayer of Ariadne or the abductor of Helen and would-be abductor of Persephone. Some of the victims of Theseus were not, in the traditions of their own cities, the brigands and monsters they appear in Attic legend. Kerkyon, Sinis and Skeiron were all half-brothers of Theseus, being sons of Poseidon; the last two were also his relations on the maternal side. In the tradition of his native Megara Skeiron is a highly respected person, a suppressor of brigandage. He married Chariklo, daughter of Kychreus, an honoured figure in Corinthian as well as Megarian legend; their daughter, Endeis, married no less a hero than Aeacus, and became by him mother of Telamon and Peleus. Megarian historians, Plutarch says, defended Skeiron, 'coming to grips with the tradition, as Simonides put it, and "fighting against time immemorial"'.<sup>138</sup> Had any poet written disrespectfully of Skeiron at Megara, there would have been complaints. Pindar's retraction of insult to Neoptolemus has a precedent in the famous case of the palinode, or rather palinodes, of Stesichorus addressed to Helen. It has been surmised that Stesichorus had to recant because he had displeased the Spartans, for whom Helen was the centre of an important cult.<sup>139</sup> Pindar was writing not long after the Aeginetans, asked by the Thebans for help in battle, had lent them the statues of the Aiakidai. On that occasion the Aiakidai were not successful; but at Salamis they were carried round the fleet, and the Greeks were encouraged by the thought of fighting on the territory of the greatest warrior heroes of their mythology.<sup>140</sup> There is no doubt that in Pindar's time hero cult was an important factor in religion, and consequently in politics; and it followed that the treatment of cult heroes by poets was matter of legitimate public interest.

Just as Pindar rejects certain discreditable stories about the gods, so he is jealous of the honour of certain heroes. Obligated, in the Fifth Nemean, to touch on the departure from Aegina of Peleus and Telamon, he treads delicately when he comes to their murder of their half-brother Phocus, son of Aeacus by the Nereid Psamatheia. Pindar might, indeed, have avoided the story altogether; still, his caution will have shown his patrons his care for the reputation of their ancestors. In the Third Nemean he dextrously avoids the story that the young Achilles fed upon live animals which he had captured, and also the legend that Peleus led his army into Iolkos through gates each of which had upon it half of Hippolyte, wife of Akastos, who had plotted against his life for having rejected her advances.<sup>141</sup> In the Thirteenth Olympian, he prefers not to describe the end of Bellerophon; in the Seventh Olympian, he skirts the topic of those early Rhodians of doubtful reputation, the Telchines. Here, surely, is a point at which the poetic world of Pindar shared a frontier with the world of contemporary reality.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> οἱ δὲ Μεγαροῦθεν συγγραφεῖς ἠμύσε τῆι φήμη βαδίζοντες καὶ τῶι πολλῶι χρόνῳι κατὰ Σιμωνίδην πολεμοῦντες οὔτε ὕβριστήν οὔτε ληιστήν γεγονέναι τὸν Σκίρωνά φασιν, ἀλλὰ ληιστῶν μὲν κολαστήν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ καὶ δικαίων οἰκείον ἀνδρῶν καὶ φίλον *Vit. Thes.* 10. The growth of the Theseus saga has been traced by H. Herter, *RL. Mus.* 85, 1936, 177 f. and 193 f. and 88, 1939, 244 f. and 289 f.

<sup>139</sup> See C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, 2nd. edn., 1961, 110 f.

<sup>140</sup> See Herodotus 5,79 f. and 8,64 and 83-4. Theseus, like the hero Echelos or Echelaios, fought at Marathon (Plutarch, *Vit. Thesei* 35; Pausanias I, 32,4). See Brelich, *op. cit.* (n. 28), 91; Rohde, *Psyche* (English version) 136 f.

<sup>141</sup> *Nem.* 5.13 f.; *Nem.* 3.34; *ib.*, 45 f. See D. S. Robertson's article 'The Food of Achilles', *Cl. Rev.* 54, 1940, especially pp. 178 f.; more instances are

given by M. C. van der Kolf, *Quaeritur quomodo Pindarus fabulas tractaverit quidque in eis mutarit*, 1933, also by C. M. Bowra, *Pindar*, 1964, ch. 2.

<sup>142</sup> Much of the material included in this article formed part of lectures which I had the privilege of delivering as Alexander White Visiting Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago in the Fall Term of 1972. I profited greatly from discussing the problems in question with Professor Anne Burnett: and I have been greatly encouraged by learning that Professor Mary Lefkowitz, in a chapter of a forthcoming book which she kindly permitted me to read, has concluded, independently of me, that the generally held view that the end of the Second Pythian Ode contains a defence of the poet against slanderers is to be rejected. [Cf. now E. Thummer, *Rh. Mus.* 115, 1972, 293 f.]